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The new Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, enacted by Parliament and effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary
objective of the Bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an inflation targeting system, the
Bank seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of
several years.
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of central bank policies and enhance transparency,
the Bank publishes the ‘Quarterly Report on Inflation’, covering recent and prospective developments in inflation and
evaluating the macroeconomic developments determining inflation. This publication summarises the projections and
deliberations that underlie the decisions of the Monetary Council.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, carries out a comprehensive
review of the expected development of inflation once every three months, in order to establish the monetary condi-
tions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The first section of the publication is the Statement of the
Monetary Council, containing its current assessment of economic perspectives and the grounds for its decisions. This
is followed by an analysis prepared by the Economics Department on the outlook for inflation and the main underly-
ing macroeconomic developments. The expected path and uncertainty of the exogenous factors used in the projection
reflect the opinion of the Monetary Council.
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STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY COUNCIL
Better inflation outlook
for 2004; the projections
are closer to the inflation
target.
Wage growth and fiscal
policy continue to present
upside risks to the inflation
outlook
Factors enhancing and
weakening the disinflation
process in 2003
Slow wage adjustment
Continued robust growth
in domestic demand slows
disinflation
Only further fiscal adjust-
ment can help return to
the path envisaged in the
Medium-Term Economic
Policy Programme
Previous measures to tighten monetary policy have stimulated goods markets to
adjust their pricing behaviour to the lower inflation environment, as reflected in a
sharp decline in core inflation seen in the past few months. The Monetary Council
judges that, over the next eighteen months, the economy will continue to adjust.
The MNB's central inflation projection for end-2004 has been revised down to 3.9%,
which is closer to the inflation target of 3.5%, relevant for monetary policy decisions.
There is greater likelihood of a lower oil price than that underlying the inflation pro-
jection, which, in turn, adds to the downside risk to the central inflation projection.
Nevertheless, the slow adjustment by wages to lower inflation and the moderate
pace at which fiscal policy is contracting demand continue to present significant
upside risks to inflation.
Disinflation has continued in 2003, especially in respect of the prices of goods and
services influenced by monetary policy. Buoyant consumption growth continues to
be a source of inflationary pressure, due partly to a number of fiscal measures passed
in 2002 and partly to rapid growth in real wages. However, during the rest of the
year, factors exogenous to monetary policy are expected to put downward pressure
on inflation. As concerns developments in the foreign and domestic markets, the fall
in oil prices and the strengthening of the euro against the dollar as well as the change
in regulated prices, respectively, are likely to give further momentum to disinflation.
The Bank’s annual inflation projection for December 2003 is around 4.6%.
Private sector wage growth has continued to moderate at a slower-than-expected
pace. Hindering labour market adjustment, government sector wages have been ris-
ing  robustly, due to last year's measures. In addition, employment in the public sec-
tor has risen by more than 4%. Firms adjust to the brisk increase in labour costs by
reducing their demand for labour, which, in turn, results in higher unemployment.
Faster wage adjustment would help the corporate sector to improve profitability and
maintain competitiveness as well as the economy to register higher growth.
Hungary's GDP is expected to grow by 3.5% both in 2003 and 2004. This can be
attributed to the fact that there continue to be no signs of a fast recovery of global
business conditions. Consequently, growth in exports and investment demand will
likely remain modest. In addition to cost-push inflation caused by fast wage growth,
the continued rapid rise in domestic demand is also acting to slow down disinflation.
As a positive effect of households' favourable income position, consumption is
expected to increase by around 7% in 2003 and by around 5% in 2004, followed
by last year's expansion of more than 10%.
Despite the measures to improve the balance, the contractionary impact of fiscal
policy on demand will likely be significantly lower than planned in 2003, and is
expected to amount to 0.5% of GDP. Given the current situation, fiscal policy will
likely be able to offset this year's delay in the process of implementing the
Government's Medium-Term Economic Policy Programme only partially in 2004.
Unless further substantial actions to improve the balance are taken, general go-
At its meeting on 12 May 2003, the Monetary Council discussed and approved for publication the May 2003 issue
of the Quarterly Report on Inflation. The Council made the following assessment of developments in inflation.
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STATEMENT BY THE MONETARY COUNCIL
Budapest, 12 May 2003 The Magyar Nemzeti Bank
The Monetary Council
Successful stabilisation
after speculation on the
appreciation of the forint
vernment will be able to reduce growth in aggregate demand by 1.3% of GDP in
2004, on the basis of the foreseeable macroeconomic developments. A departure
from the original fiscal path would hamper any correction of last year's unfavourable
economic policy mix, i.e. tight monetary and lax fiscal policies.
During the one-and-a-half months following the revaluation speculation of 15–16
January, the main motive of the official interest rate decisions was to return to the nor-
mal course of business and stabilise monetary conditions. The efforts proved suc-
cessful – through a more proactive presence on the foreign exchange market, the
Bank had managed to ensure that the bulk of the speculative capital left the
Hungarian banking system without jeopardising the stability of the exchange rate and
the financial system. The forint has stayed around HUF/EUR 245 since early February.
The yield curve, too, has been stable since the restoration of the standard width of
the Bank’s overnight interest rate corridor on 24 February.
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Summary table of projections
Percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated
2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual data Projection
February Current Report February Current Report
Report Report
CPI
December 6.8 4.8 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.9
Annual average 9.2 5.3 5.2 4.5 4.6 4.1
Economic growth
External demand 1.6 –0.8 3.9 2.6–3.7–4.5 4.8 3.0–4.6–6.1
Manufacturing value added 1.6 0.51 3.5 2.0–3.3–4.5 4.2 2.5–4.4–6.0
Household consumption2 5.7 10.2 6.6 5.2–6.6–7.4 4.1 3.5–5.0–6.5
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 5.8 3.4 2.5–4.0–5.0 3.1 2.0–4.3–6.0
Domestic absorption 1.9 5.1 4.3 4.4–4.9–5.4 3.3 3.6–4.3–5.0
Exports 8.8 3.8 4.03 1.8–3.4–5.0 7.03 4.0–6.7–9.5
Imports 6.1 6.1 5.23 3.3–5.3–7.3 6.53 4.4–7.4–10.4
GDP 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.2–3.4–3.6 3.6 3.2–3.6–4.0
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 3.4 4.0 5.04 4.7–5.1–5.5 4.64 4.6–5.1–5.6
EUR billions 2.0 2.8 3.74 3.6–3.9–4.2 3.64 3.8–4.2–4.6
Fiscal stance
Demand impact 1.8 4.3 (–0.9) (–1.0)–(–0.5)–0.2 (–2.4) (–2.5)–(–1.3)–0.0
Labour market (private sector)5
Wage inflation 14,6 12,8 7,8 7,9 – 8,8 –9,7 5,4 5,3 – 6,5 –7,7
Employment 1,1 (–0,2) (–0,1) (–0,9)–(–0,4)–0,1 0,1 (–1,0)–(–0,2)–0,6
ULC based real exchange rate in manufacturing6
Annual average 8,6 11,3 (–0,1) 1,5 – 1,0 – 0,5 (–1,1) (–1,0)–(–1,7)–(–2,4)
Q4 14,5 8,9 (–4,5) (–2,8)–(–3,3)–(–3,8) 0,2 0,0 –(–0,7)–(–1,4)
The central projection is marked in bold, surrounded by the lower and upper limits of the projection. There is a 60 per cent probability that the
value of the variable falls within the range defined by these limits.
1 Adjusted series in 2002 Q3-Q4.
2 Household consumption expenditure.
3 With the effect of the change in statistical methodology removed, see Section II. page 36.
4 With the effect of the change in statistical methodology removed, see Section II. page 38.
5 Average for manufacturing and services.
6 Positive values denote appreciation and negative values denote depreciation.
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MNB forecasts versus other projections
2003 2004
CPI (December, per cent)
MNB* 4.6 3.9
Reuters poll (April 2003) 4.9 4.1
CPI (annual average, per cent)
MNB* 4.5 4.1
Consensus Economics (March 2003)** 5.1 4.4
European Commission (April 2003) 5.0 4.5
IMF (April 2003) 5.3 4.8
OECD (April 2003) 5.2 4.6
Reuters poll (April 2003) 4.8 4.3
GDP (annual growth rate, per cent)
MNB* 3.4 3.6
Consensus Economics (March 2003)** 3.6 4.1
European Commission(April 2003) 3.7 4.1
IMF (April 2003) 3.6 3.9
OECD (April 2003) 3.1 3.7
Reuters poll (April 2003) 3.6 4.1
Current account deficit (EUR billions)
MNB* 3.9 4.2
Consensus Economics (March 2003)** 3.7 3.9
Reuters poll (April 2003) 3.3 3.8
Current account deficit (as a per cent of GDP)***
MNB* 5.1 5.1
European Commission (April 2003) 4.4 3.5
IMF (April 2003) 4.8 4.6
OECD (April 2003) 4.5 3.8
* MNB forecasts are conditional on certain policy variables (forint exchange rate, interest rate, fiscal policy) and some exogenous variables (dol-
lar/euro exchange rate, oil prices) and thus cannot be directly compared to other forecasts.
** Consensus Economics’ forecasts are from the ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’ survey.
*** Current account figures are calculated in USD. The average 2002 EUR/USD cross rate was used as the rate of conversion.
I. INFLATION

Inflation in 2003 Q1 amounted to 4.6%, following a
rate of 4.8% at end-2002, which was in line with the
inflation target set by the MNB two years ago. This rate
of 4.6% was very low, considering the historically high
inflation environment of the Hungarian economy. Since
the early 1980s the consumer price index (CPI) has
never fallen consistently below 5% in Hungary.
First quarter inflation figures were lower than projected
in the MNB’s February Report. This unexpectedly rapid
progress in disinflation can be ascribed to the develop-
ment of prices influenced by monetary policy, while the
overall effect of exogenous developments beyond the
control of monetary policy (e.g. oil prices) was neutral.
Compared, however, to inflation rates in the ten EU
accession countries, prices increased at a fast pace,
exceeded currently in only three of these countries1 (see
chart I-2).
In assessing the data for 2003 Q1, one must be careful
in respect of two factors in particular, as the end-of-
quarter data show a somewhat different picture than
the data from the previous two months.
On the other hand, at the same time the price indices of
items most affected by monetary policy, which are
instrumental in assessing longer-term inflation develop-
ments, also fell. This implies that the first-quarter data
should by no means be swept aside as noise or regard-
ed as independent of monetary policy. As these items-
tradables, market services and processed food-are cru-
cial to the core inflation indicator, the following analysis
focuses primarily on core inflation.
Data versus the previous projection
In 2003 Q1, inflation fell by 0.2 percentage points. This
decline can be primarily accounted for by the surpris-
ingly low rates of inflation in tradables and market ser-
vices prices. As a result, core inflation fell by 0.7 per-
centage points during the quarter, dropping at a sub-
stantially higher rate than the total CPI.
Developments during the quarter indicate that core
inflation fell particularly quickly in January in a month-
on-month comparison, while in the remaining two
months, price changes gradually returned to rates typi-
cal in 2002.
The low index in January was essentially associated with
declines in market services and processed food inflation
rates. By contrast, in February tradables prices account-
ed for the low level of core inflation. It should be noted
that while the monthly indices for durable goods have
reflected deflation ever since the widening of the
exchange rate band, this development also appeared in
the entire tradables group in February.
Alcohol and tobacco price inflation, covered by the
core indicator but also significantly influenced by tax
regulations, accelerated during the quarter, while infla-
tion in goods and services exogenous to monetary
policy remained flat. The reasons for the rise in motor
fuel and tobacco prices seen at the start of the year
included high oil prices and the delayed impact of an
earlier rise in excise duties (in September 2002), res-
pectively.
A comparison of the Bank’s February forecast with
actual figures for 2003 Q1 yields a similar picture.
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PREVIOUS INFLATION PROJECTION VERSUS CURRENT INFLATION
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Chart I-1 Hungarian inflation rates, 1976–2003
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
1 These three countries are Slovenia, Slovakia and Cyprus. However, in the latter two countries, this higher rate of inflation is associated with one-off taxa-
tion and regulatory measures (such as regulated price increases early this year in Slovakia and a tax rise in Cyprus also early in the year) and can be
viewed as temporary. In 2002, inflation in these two countries was lower than in Hungary.
I.
One important implication is that the actual CPI is 0.3
percentage points lower than the projection, due pri-
marily to an error in forecasting core inflation (see
table I-1).
The figures in the table also show that the difference
between actual figures and the February projection was
due to other factors than any significant differences
between the actual and assumed values of the applied
explanatory variables. It is important to note that unit
labour costs turned out to be lower than projected,
despite higher-than-expected nominal wage growth.
This implies that the difference could be attributed to
developments reflecting some gradual nominal adjust-
ment to the disinflation environment (see table I-2).
14 THE MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
I. INFLATION
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ja
n.
 0
1
M
ar
. 0
1
M
ay
 0
1
Ju
ly
. 0
1
Se
pt
. 0
1
N
ov
. 0
1
Ja
n.
 0
2
M
ar
. 0
2
M
ay
 0
2
Ju
ly
. 0
2
Se
pt
. 0
2
N
ov
. 0
2
Ja
n.
 0
3
M
ar
. 0
3
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Cyprus Czech Republic Hungary Lithuania Latvia
Poland EstoniaSlovak RepublicSlovenia
Percent Percent
Chart I-2 Inflation in Hungary and other accession countries, 2001–2003
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Chart I-4 Inflation of the prices of the key com-
ponents of core inflation (Annualised
monthly indices)
The short-term forecasts of the February Report for core
inflation in 2003 Q1 also used methods relying on the
inertia of developments. International experience sug-
gests that such methods perform better in the short
term than structural approaches.
Since the February Report, the Bank has further widened
the range of methods used for short term forecasting.
Thus, in addition to the inertia of the process to be fore-
cast, statistically estimated relationships with other factors
are also taken into account. One major advantage of this
improvement is that these methods usually perform better
with respect to predicting turning points in the short run.
The difference between the projection for core inflation
published in the February Report and the actual out-
come was exceptionally large, which might have been
the consequence of the inadequacy of previous models
used to prepare the short-term projections. However,
analyses have shown that, if the Bank had possessed in
February the full range of methods currently being used,
the actual outcome would still have been missed by the
same magnitude as the published forecast2. 
In respect of items not covered by core inflation, the
forecasting errors cancel out. Motor fuel prices rose pri-
marily due to high oil prices, while the price of pork fell
more sharply than forecast.
The lower-than-projected index for regulated prices is
accounted for by lower-than-expected increases in the
price of electricity and telephone charges.
Assessment of the developments
There is greater-than-usual uncertainty about what the
first-quarter developments imply for the future. This
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I.
Weight % Actual February Difference Effect of the
projection difference on 
Percentage change on a year earlier Percentage points CPI*
Foodstuffs 18.8 1.6 1.9 0.3 0.06
unprocessed 6.3 –0.8 –1.7 –0.9 –0.06
processed 12.5 2.7 3.6 0.9 0.11
Tradables 26.6 1.4 1.9 0.5 0.14
Market services 19.1 8.5 9.0 0.5 0.10
Market-priced energy 1.5 6.5 5.3 –1.2 –0.02
Motor fuels 4.7 14.4 12.3 –2.1 –0.10
Alcohol and tobacco 9.8 10.5 9.7 –0.8 –0.07
Regulated prices 19.4 3.0 3.6 0.6 0.11
CPI 100.0 4.6 4.9 0.3 0.27
Core inflation 68.1 5.0 5.3 0.3 0.31
Table I-1 Projection in February versus actual data
* Due to rounding sums do not add up precisely
* MNB estimate
**  Estimate based on actual data for 2002 Q4.
***  Annualised monthly growth rates.
February Actual*
projection
Gross private sector
wage growth 10.1% 10.3%**
Unit labour cost (ULC) 5.5% 5.2%**
Household consumption
expenditure 7.4% 8.3%**
Forint/euro exchange rate 245 243.63
HUF/EUR HUF/EUR
Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.062 1.073
USD/EUR USD/EUR
Brent oil price 31.2 31.4
dollar/barrel dollar/barrel
Imported inflation *** 1.1% 0.6%
Table I-2 Assumptions and forecasts of the
February projection and actual data
for 2003 Q1
2 It is worth noting that the forecast error of the so-called VAR (vector autoregression) model introduced in this forecasting round was 0.3 percentage
points in the first quarter of 2003. The model has not produced forecast errors of this magnitude since the widening of the exchange rate band.
uncertainty stems from two sources. First, the data fail
to convey an unequivocal message. Second, there is a
wide range of possible explanations.
The uncertainty about the data arises from the fact that
while the quarterly rates reflect a clear decline in core
inflation, the monthly breakdown suggests that this is
primarily due to the surprise drop in core inflation in
January, whereas the February and March indices show
an upward trend. Nevertheless, the tradables price
index was at its lowest in February, and even showed
some evidence of deflation.
This may have been due to the very strong exchange
rate in 2002 Q4 and early 2003, which stimulated retail-
ers to replenish inventories at low cost and sell out in
the course of February. If so, then this is clearly a one-
off effect, and will not lower inflation of tradables prices
over the longer term, in contrast to the exchange rate
pass-through arising from steady appreciation.
The main problem is that while low core inflation
reflects that the goods market may be starting to adjust 
to the low inflation environment, there is no such clear
evidence of adjustment by the labour market.
Slow wage adjustment will increase the real economic
costs of disinflation, because if nominal wages continue to
rise faster than prices, profitability will decline, leaving
firms with no other way to adjust but to cut their work-
force. This in turn will reduce output: in other words, low
inflation will entail high real economic costs. As nominal
wage growth was high during the first three months, it
cannot be ruled out that the low inflation seen early in the
year is the first symptom of the process outlined above.
On the other hand, data on consumer spending in 2003
Q1 reflect stronger demand-pull inflation, further exac-
erbated by the fact that the significant fiscal expansion
in 2002 is only expected to be followed by a moderate
cut in expenditures this year.
Thus, by allowing multiple interpretations, develop-
ments in inflation in 2003 Q1, although definitely
favourable, introduce significant uncertainty into the
Bank’s projections.
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I.
Inflation in 2003 Q1 was substantially lower than expect-
ed by the Bank. As noted in the previous section, even
the Bank’s best available methods would have failed to
foresee the low price index measured in the previous
quarter. The MNB believes that progress in disinflation
will increasingly have an indirect impact at the level of
the whole economy, and thus enhance the sustainability
of the lower level of inflation which has been achieved.
Hence, the surprise disinflation experienced over the past
three months has also resulted in a lower year-end infla-
tion projection. On the other hand, there are higher risks
to the projection than previously. All in all, the inflation
projections for December 2003 and 2004 are 4.6% and
3.9%, respectively, both lower than estimated in the pre-
vious Report. This points to a broadly stagnating rate of
inflation in the second half of this year, followed by a
gradual decline in inflation next year.
Short term projection
The Bank’s short-term projection for next-quarter CPI is
4.3%. This is partly due to a further decline in the
expected growth rate of prices of goods and services
relevant for monetary policy. Most of the decline, how-
ever, will be due to a projected fall in the price of motor
fuels and a number of unprocessed food products.
However, this rapid disinflation is expected to be inter-
rupted at the end of the quarter. One of the factors
behind this is that prices of unprocessed foodstuffs are
not expected to fall as sharply as at the beginning of last
summer. Second, most of the May rise in natural gas
prices will appear in the price index in June.
Long term projection
The Bank’s inflation projection for December 2003 is
4.6%, which is 0.6 percentage points lower than in the
February Report. The 3.9% price index projected for
December 2004 has been revised down by 0.1 per-
centage point only.
All in all, disinflation continues gradually over the next
18 months or so, due primarily to a slow, steady decline
in inflation relevant for monetary policy. It should be
noted that from now on the Bank will not publish price
indices for the individual components of core inflation
(processed food, tradables, non-tradables, alcoholic
drinks and tobacco), but only for core inflation as a
whole and the items not included in that indicator (see
table I-3).
The difference between the current and February pro-
jections for December 2003 is primarily due to the drop
in motor fuel prices due to lower oil prices and declining
inflation in goods and services covered by core inflation.
While the main factor in the difference between the
projections for December 2004 is the fall in motor fuel
prices, the components of core inflation exert upward
pressure. This is because the aggregate disinflation
observed in early 2003, which was somewhat sooner
than expected, is projected to slow down in the course
of 2004, due to fiscal policy’s weaker-than-assumed
restriction and large increases in private sector wages.
Nevertheless, in the current projection, prices for regu-
lated goods and services increase in both years at a
lower rate than previously expected. By contrast,
unprocessed food prices may increase at a slightly
faster pace than assumed, simultaneously with an
increase in downside risk (see table I-4).
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INFLATION PROJECTION
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Chart I-5 Fan chart of the inflation projection*
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes
around the central projection. The entire coloured area covers 90% of
all probabilities. The central band covers 30% of the distribution, and
contains the central projection (as the mode); outer bands cover 15%
probability each. The point for end-2004 and the marks above and
below represent the inflation target value (3.5%) and the upper and
lower limits of the ±1% tolerance interval.
The forecast assumes that, although the sustained nomi-
nal appreciation of the forint was the initial phase in dis-
inflation, this process will exert its full impact via indirect
effects over the course of several years. In the wake of
appreciation following the widening of the exchange rate
band in May 2001, import prices fell in forint terms,
which soon led to slower inflation or even deflation in the
price of internationally traded goods. In addition, there
was also a general decline in the inflation of domestic
tradables prices competing with imported goods.
The lower-than-projected CPI in the past quarter and
the TÁRKI survey of firms’ inflation expectations indi-
cate that the second phase of disinflation, in which firms
begin to adjust in the goods market at the whole-econ-
omy level has begun to be reflected in consumer prices.
This is because the progress in disinflation up to now
may also influence firms’ pricing behaviour by lowering
their inflation expectations (see chart I-6).
Furthermore, the slowdown in sales price inflation has
occurred simultaneously with a visible but slow decline in
wage inflation, leading to a narrowing of corporate prof-
it margins. Agents must adjust to the lower inflation envi-
ronment by reducing their real wage costs or increasing
their productivity. The Bank expects this adjustment to
pick up pace in the labour market next year.
In sum, while the disinflation process last year and the
year before was governed by the appreciation of the
real exchange rate, there was only moderate adjust-
ment in terms of domestic real economic develop-
ments, wages and expectations. The Bank’s expectation
is that the real exchange rate will contribute to disinfla-
tion to an ever lesser extent from this year on.3 At the
same time, as a consequence of adjustment by domes-
tic agents, the emerging low inflation environment may
become sustainable, becoming the engine of further
disinflation.
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Fact Projection
Weight
2003 2003 2004
% I. II. III. IV. Dec. I. II. III. IV. Dec.
Core inflation projection 68.1 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.8
Unprocessed food 6.3 –0.8 0.7 8.7 7.8 8.5 6.5 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.2
Motor fuels and market-priced 
energy 6.2 12.5 3.4 –1.4 –1.5 –1.1 –5.5 0.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
Regulated prices 19.4 3.0 4.5 7.1 6.6 6.5 7.2 5.6 4.3 4.6 4.6
CPI 100.0 4.6 4.3 4.8 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9
Annual average 4.5 4.1
Table I-3 Central projection for the CPI
I.
* The incidental difference between total CPI and the sum of its components is due to rounding error.
Table I-4 Difference between the current projection and the February projection (Percentage points)
Difference in absolute terms Contribution by component 
to difference in CPI*
Dec. 2003. Dec. 2004. Dec. 2003. Dec. 2004.
Core inflation projection –0.4 0.1 –0.22 0.09
Unprocessed food 1.9 0.5 0.13 0.03
Motor fuels and market-priced energy –7.4 –1.7 –0.45 –0.11
Regulated prices –0.8 –0.7 –0.14 –0.13
CPI –0.6 –0.1 –0.64 –0.12
3 See M. Z. Jakab and M. A. Kovács: Explaining Exchange Rate Pass-through in Hungary: Simulations with the NIGEM model, MNB Working Papers
2003/5; and Quarterly Report on Inflation, February 2003 (see http://www.mnb.hu/)
As a consequence, the Bank views most of the disinfla-
tion-induced change in the price level of items mainly
influenced by monetary policy in 2003 Q1 as perma-
nent. On the other hand, such a sharp acceleration in
disinflation can be only temporary. This implies that core
inflation in 2004 may decline at a lower rate than pro-
jected in the February Report, because in 2004 the fiscal
impact on demand and private sector wage growth may
exceed the previous assumption (see chart I-7).
The numerical assumptions underlying the central
projection have changed relative to the February pro-
jection. The oil price assumption is approximately 20
percent lower than in February and thus puts down-
ward pressure on inflation, mainly over the short
term. Furthermore, the assumptions for the US dol-
lar/euro exchange rate and imported tradables infla-
tion have also been revised downward, while the
projection for household consumption and private
sector wages exert upward pressure on inflation,
mainly over the long term (see table I-5).
In line with the previous approach, the Monetary
Council has decided to use a constant oil price
assumption underlying the central projection. In
other words, the average of the prices observed in
April 2003 is projected over the full forecast hori-
zon. By contrast, alternative oil price scenarios (de-
rived from futures prices and the March 2003 Con-
sensus Economics survey) indicate higher oil prices
this year and lower prices next year. The two alter-
native paths would result in marginally higher infla-
tion at the end of this year and a 0.3-percentage-
point lower rate at the end of next year, relative to
the central projection (see chart I-8).
Regulated prices would increase at a lower rate than
assumed in the February Report, primarily because of
the planned household compensation for the rise in gas
prices.
It should be noted that the Bank’s projection also takes
account of the impact on inflation of a number of
mandatory taxation and regulatory measures associated
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February 2003  Current  Difference
projection projection
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
HUF/EUR exchange rate 245.0 245.61 +0.2%
USD/EUR exchange rate (in cents) 106.2 108.51 +2.2%
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 31.2 25.01 –19.9%
Imported tradables inflation (%)3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 –0.12 –0.12
Private sector wage inflation (%) 7.8 5.4 8.8 6.5 +1.02 +1.12
Growth in household consumption 
expenditure (%)4 6.6 4.1 6.6 5.0 0.02 +0.92
Table I-5 Assumptions underlying the central projection
1 April 2003 average.
2 Percentage points.
3 Average annualised monthly growth rates. Euro area-11 industrial goods inflation. Source: Eurostat NewCronos code: igoodsxe.
4 Annual average.
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Chart I-8 Alternative oil price assumptions
with Hungary’s accession to the European Union. These
specific measures will raise the price index by roughly
0.5–0.6 percentage points in 2003 and 0.2–0.5 per-
centage points in 2004.4
Uncertainty surrounding the central projection
The probability distribution of the central projection has
been estimated based on the Bank’s historical forecast-
ing errors and the uncertainties perceived by the
Monetary Council (see table I-6). These risks include
developments in wages, oil prices and the fiscal stance.
There is an approximately 30% probability that inflation
will be lower or higher than the target at end-2004
(3.5% ±1%) The balance of risks to the central inflation
projection is on the downside in both 2003 and 2004.
According to the assessment of the Monetary Council,
the risks to the central wage projection are balanced. The
assumption of constant oil prices (25 USD/barrel) on the
other hand constitutes a downside risk to the inflation
outlook in 2003 and 2004.
In 2004, the extent of fiscal policy’s impact on demand
will be a source of symmetrical uncertainty. According to
the Bank’s calculations this may equally increase or
reduce the rate of inflation in December 2004 by 0.1 per-
centage point. The impact of the various fiscal scenarios
on inflation will, however, unfold over the course of
several years.
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90% lower 60% lower 30% lower Central path 30% upper 60% upper 90% upper
(mode)
2003 Q2 3.1 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.8 5.3
2003 Q3 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.5 6.2
2003 Q4 2.1 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.3 6.2
2004 Q1 1.9 3.1 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.3 6.2
2004 Q2 1.4 2.8 3.6 4.3 4.7 5.3 6.2
2004 Q3 0.8 2.3 3.2 3.9 4.4 5.0 6.1
2004 Q4 0.5 2.2 3.1 3.9 4.4 5.1 6.2
Table I-6 Bounds of the bands in the fan chart (Changes on a year earlier)
4 See Chapter V, Tax and regulation approximation measures affecting inflation.

II. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The Bank expects the rate of economic growth to be
3.4% this year and 3.6% next year. Thus, the average
growth rate in 2003–2004 will be similar to that of the
previous two years.
On balance, the Bank's current view of domestic eco-
nomic performance in 2003 has remained virtually
unchanged since the February Report. This is the con-
sequence of a number of offsetting developments.
Fiscal restriction is anticipated to be smaller both in
2003 and 2004, which would alone encourage faster
economic growth. The uncertainty surrounding the
Bank's current forecast of a pick-up in external
demand has increased. This, in turn, has slightly
reduced the forecasts for corporate sector perfor-
mance and exports in the two years considered.5
Based on actual data for recent months, the negative
effect of the currency's real appreciation on econom-
ic growth has been revised up relative to the previous
forecast.
In view of new information, fiscal policy’s contrac-
tionary impact on demand is expected to be lower this
year. With respect to 2004, the Bank has departed from
the assumptions based on the Government's Medium-
Term Economic Programme (PEP). The contractionary
impact is currently estimated to be 1.3% of GDP, in
contrast with 2.4% in the previous Report.
The most recent data on external demand appear to
reinforce the earlier assumption that the bottom of the
current cycle may have been passed. Nevertheless,
there is considerable uncertainty, and the Bank con-
tinues to expect slow recovery in the period ahead.
In the labour market, modest adjustment in private sector
wages has recently been seen; however, wages in the
general government sector, and the number of employ-
ees in particular, surpassed the Bank's expectations by a
large margin. Consequently, the Bank maintains its fore-
cast of slower growth than in 2002, but nevertheless
strong growth in household consumption in 2003.
In terms of the underlying trends in the labour market,
the uncertainties engendered by higher unemployment
are likely to be a factor reducing households' propensi-
ty to consume. This effect was already reflected in
movements in the household confidence index in the
early months of the year.
In 2002 Q4, the decline in corporate fixed investment
activity came to a halt. The forecast for fixed capital
formation reflects the divergent developments in exter-
nal business cycle conditions and fiscal policy. In the
current projection, corporate fixed investment picks up,
in tandem with growth in external demand. Following
last year's salient outturn, the rate of growth of house-
hold fixed investment will likely be lower in 2003 and
stabilise in 2004. Public sector fixed investment activity
is also expected to slow down gradually, consistent with
the assumed fiscal path (see table II-1).
According to the Bank's foreign trade forecast, in 2003
export of goods is expected to be heavily influenced by
the delayed negative effects of the real appreciation
towards end-2002. In contrast to merchandise trade,
the appreciation effect was already reflected in travel in
2002. Consequently, Hungary's travel revenue is not
expected to shrink further, provided that the interna-
tional climate improves. The growth rate of imports
exceeded that of exports in the previous quarters. This
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percentage changes on previous 
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5 The Bank's forecast for exports in 2003 appear to be significantly lower than in the February Report. The reason for this, however, is the recent method-
ological change, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2. External trade
II.
trend is expected to continue over the short term. On
the longer horizon, however, the wedge between
export and import growth is likely to narrow, accompa-
nied by a pick-up in external demand.
All in all, the Bank’s projection for economic growth has
remained virtually unchanged. The Bank’s projection of
3.4% for 2003 is roughly consistent with that of other
public forecasters, such as international institutions and
market analysts. By contrast, the projected 3.6% GDP
growth in 2004 is lower than predicted by most fore-
casters. Even though the details on which the forecasts
are based are rarely published, the difference is pre-
sumably due to the MNB’s lower forecast for fixed cap-
ital formation (see table II-2).
External demand
For Hungary as a small, open economy, changes in
external economic activity, and in foreign demand for
Hungarian exports in particular, are of great significance.
Whereas developments in external economic activity
can be characterised using several indicators, foreign
demand for Hungarian exports can be captured best by
developments in imports of the country's major trading
partners. By virtue of the share they account for within
Hungarian exports (and the reliability of their data
reporting), the effective external demand indicator
takes into account import data of 12 countries covering
some 80% of Hungarian goods exports.
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Weight** 2001 2002 2003 2004
%* Estimation Projection
Corporate sector 57 1.0 (–2.3) (–1)– 3 3–8
General government 19 (–6.9) 21.7 4–10 (–1)–8
Households 24 21.4 18.3 6–10 (–1)–5
Investments 100 3.2 5.9 2.5–5.0 2.0–6.0
Table II-1 Sectoral breakdown of fixed investments (Annual percentage changes)
* Investment data, which may differ from those on gross fixed capital formation see Manual to Hungarian Economics Statistic.
** Includes all government spending on motorway construction, for 2002 MNB calculation
Belgium
2.7%
Spain
2.4%
Czech. Rep.
1.9%
Switzerland
1.1%
Other*
21.2%
United States
3.5%
United
Kingdom
4.7%
Sweden
4.3%
Netherlands
4.3%
France
5.7%
Italy
5.8%
Austria
7.1%
Germany
35.5%
Chart II-2 Shares of major trading partners 
in Hungarian exports
* Economies not explicitly analysed, due to their individual 
shares within Hungarian goods trade and weak data availability, 
for example, Russia, Romania, Poland, Asian economies, etc.
II.
Actual data Forecast
2001 2002 2003 2004
Household
consumption 5.3 8.8 6.3 4.4
Household
consumption 
expenditure 5.7 10.2 6.6 5.0
Social transfers
in kind 3.8 3.0 4.7 1.9
Public
consumption 4.9 1.5 1.5 2.0
Gross fixed capital
formation 3.5 5.8 4.0 4.3
‘Final domestic
sales’* 4.8 7.3 5.3 4.2
Domestic
absorption 1.9 5.1 4.9 4.3
Exports 8.8 3.8 3.4 6.7
Imports 6.1 6.1 5.3 7.4
GDP 3.8 3.3 3.4 3.6
Table II-2 Growth in GDP and its components
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
* Final domestic sales = household consumption + public consump-
tion + gross fixed capital formation.
Developments in external demand have recently been
shaped by the global economic recession and the fac-
tors hindering the recovery from recession, for example,
terrorist attacks and international conflicts. In this unsta-
ble environment, the Bank has often been forced to
revise its forecasts for external demand in general and
for the timing of the cyclical turnaround in particular.
However, past revisions of the forecasts have not been
larger than those of forecasts by other institutions.6
Based on 2002 data, treated as final for the purposes of
the analysis, external demand bottomed out in the early
months of last year, and is currently in its upward phase.
However, the rate of this upturn looks unstable, show-
ing large deviations across countries. Looking at
Hungary's most important trading partners, import
growth in Germany, though hindered by weak domes-
tic demand, grew unexpectedly strongly in 2002 H2,
while imports by Austria declined throughout the major
part of the year, despite a pick-up in domestic demand.
The price of crude oil, which rose sharply due to the
uncertainties preceding the outbreak of the war in Iraq
(and the Venezuelan crisis), was the dominant factor
influencing external demand in 2003 Q1. European
confidence indices remained on a downward trend in
the early part of the year–available data for goods
trade and output in January-February are evidence of a
rather weak recovery. Although the fall in oil prices,
caused by the end of the Iraq conflict, may help this
recovery pick up some speed, it will probably only
gather strong momentum after the expected modest
outturns in Q1–Q2. For this reason, the Bank expects
annual average growth in external demand in 2003 to
be broadly in line with, or slightly weaker than, its pre-
vious forecast.
In 2004, the rate of growth of external demand is
expected to stabilise at around 5%, consistent with
the forecast in the previous Report. Accordingly, the
current forecast for annual average growth in exter-
nal demand is almost identical to the February fore-
cast (see table II-3, II-4 and chart II-3).
Fiscal stance
In the Bank's current forecast, the contractionary impact
of general government on demand amounts to around
0.5% of GDP in 2003, lower than previously anticipat-
ed.7 This reduction in the estimated size of fiscal restric-
tion will likely be caused by autonomous factors, for
example, higher local government expenditure and
open-ended expenditure, rather than by fiscal policy
measures.
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6 See Chapter V, Revisions to the forecast of external demand for more details.
7 It is the fiscal demand effect that matters from the perspective of short-term developments in inflation, economic growth and external balance, which
the Bank estimates using the annual change in the corrected SNA primary balance of general government, introduced in 1998 for analytical purposes.
For methodological issues, see Manual to Hungarian Economics Statistics.
II.
Table II-3 Projections for imports of Hungary’s
main trading partners*
2003 2004
Recent Prev. Recent Prev.
MNB 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.8
European Comm. 3.9 5.9 6.4 7.1
IMF 4.4 5.7 6.3 n.a.
OECD 4.1 5.5 6.8 7.6
* Data are average annual growth rates in per cent. Individual country
forecasts are weighted according to partners' shares in Hungary's
export structure.
European Commission: Economic Forecasts (April 2003/November
2002)
OECD: Economic Outlook (April 2003/November 2002)
IMF: World Economic Outlook (April 2003/September 2002)
2003 2004
Recent Prev. Recent Prev.
MNB 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.3
European Comm. 1.0 1.7 2.2 2.5
OECD 1.1 1.8 2.2 2.7
IMF 1.0 2.2 2.2 Ω
Table II-4 Implicit projections for GDP-growth of
Hungary’s main trading partners*
* See notes to previous table.
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Chart II-3 Current and previous projections for
external demand* (1995 = 100)
* Weighted volume of imports of Hungary’s main trading partners.
The Bank has prepared a forecast for 2004, instead of
using the previous technical assumption derived direct-
ly from the PEP path. If fiscal policy does not take fur-
ther measures to improve the balance, above and
beyond those taken this year, the contractionary impact
on demand will amount to 1.3% of GDP, on the basis
of foreseeable macroeconomic developments. On the
whole, the cumulative impact on demand of general
government will be an increase of 2.5% in 2002–2004.
In 2003 and 2004, the contractionary impact on
demand will be determined by various effects. Items
affecting household disposable income will grow faster
than GDP, due to the measures already legislated. On
the other hand, spending on other items, for example,
fixed investment, will be curtailed.
The current and previous central projections for 2003
are rules-based and conditional forecasts. This means
that in the range where the Government's measures
were expected to have full impact, the Bank only took
into account information available in legal instruments.
However, where there is no full government control
over the developments, the Bank prepares its own fore-
cast. Accordingly, the Bank forecasts developments in
tax revenue and expenditure on old-age pensions on
the basis of its own macroeconomic projections and the
estimated effects of government measures, while it fore-
casts autonomous fiscal developments, such as the
behaviour of local authorities and institutions, and uses
of open-ended subsidies, on the basis of observable
trends (see table II-6).
The Bank has revised down its 2003 forecast for the
contractionary impact on demand on the basis of new
information becoming available to date, due principally
to autonomous fiscal developments which the central
government is unable to fully control, for example, in
the areas of pharmaceuticals and housing subsidies,
local government wages and fixed investment. Here,
the Bank's rules-based forecast for expenditure overruns
has proven low compared with the published local
authority budgets and actual data for the first quarter of
the year which have become available in the meantime.
Consequently, the Bank’s forecast of expenditure over-
runs has been raised by 0.7% of GDP.
Based on current information, the measures taken by
fiscal policy in the course of the year will only have a
modest estimated impact on demand. The updated
macroeconomic forecasts (including, for example, a
higher wage increase) also have an impact on the esti-
mates of taxes and pensions, decreasing the deficit by
0.1% of GDP.
There continues to be a wide, broadly symmetrical
range of uncertainty around the central projection for
the contractionary impact on demand in 2003. In addi-
tion to the usual uncertainties arising from macroeco-
nomic developments, numerous measures have been
taken in the area of taxes, the impact of which can only
be estimated, and this causes difficulties in forecasting
tax revenue. Adding to these problems, for the majority
of local authorities (mainly the smaller ones) and the
majority of budgetary units, the Bank's rules-based fore-
cast does not expect excess expenditure funded from
indebtedness and uses of appropriations carried for-
ward. It is still unknown whether the Government will
implement any measure to reduce the deficit in the
course of the year and how large its actual effect (not
offset by uses of appropriations carried forward or
indebtedness) will be (see table II-7).
The Bank's current forecast for 2004 has been prepared
in lack of information about the budget. Consequently,
it has complemented the available legal information
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* Change in corrected SNA primary balance adjusted for the effect of
pension reform. The (+) sign denotes a fiscal expansion of demand,
and the (–) sign denotes a contraction. For more details, see Manual
to Hungarian Economics Statistics.
2002 2003 2004
Preliminary Central Projection
Dir. impact on demand* 4.3% –0.5% –1.3%
Table II-5 Expansionary impact of general govern-
ment on demand (As a per cent of
GDP)
II.
(1) (2) (2)–(1)
Change in SNA deficit Change in
2002 2003 demand
Preliminary Forecast effect
Effect of higher
nominal GDP –0.2 –0.2 0.0
Incorporation
of actual data 
on road
construction 0.2 n.a. –0.2
Update
of forecast n.a. +0.6 +0.6
Total change 0.0 +0.4 +0.4
Table II-6 Difference between the current 
forecast and those of the February
Report (As a per cent of GDP)
with estimates, which project the Government's past,
observable behaviour into the future. From this per-
spective, the fiscal austerity exercised in drafting the
2003 Budget, and the aggregate of autonomous fiscal
developments partly offsetting it, such as the behaviour
of local authorities and institutions, and uses of open-
ended subsidies, have been taken as a basis.
The central government has determinations for 2004 on
both the revenue and expenditure sides. Taking this and
fiscal policy's possible room for manoeuvre as a basis,
the contractionary impact of fiscal policy may amount
to 1.3% of GDP in 2004.
A neutral case in which revenue grows broadly in line
with nominal GDP could be taken as the starting point.
The measures already taken (for example, customs
duties and taxes will fall by 1.1% as a proportion of
GDP) have in part used up this additional revenue from
nominal growth in GDP; and the balance of EU contri-
butions and transfers can only slightly improve this.
The full-year effect of decisions taken on expenditures in
the course of this year (wages and widows’ pension),
the automatic measures (indexation of pensions), and
other measures (partial payment of 13th month pen-
sions) are determined up to some 1.1% of GDP.
As concerns wage expenditures, the Bank assumes as a
minimum case that their real growth will not exceed half
of real growth in GDP. In the case of other, non-deter-
mined expenditures (for example, non-wage and non-
pension items), additional amounts of around 0.8% of
GDP can be saved or re-channelled for wage payment.
Within the range of expenditures on fixed investment,
corporate subsidies and goods and services, quasi-
determinations, such as expenditures on infrastructure,
defence and agricultural subsidies, affected by the cur-
tailment of appropriations, require further re-chan-
nelling.
In assessing the possible effects on the macroeconomic
variables of extreme values arising from uncertainties,
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Higher contractionary impact Lower contractionary impact
Higher tax revenue 0.1 Lower tax revenue 0.1
Delays in local authority fixed investment Pick-up in broadly defined public sector
programmes 0.1 fixed investment 0.2
Reform of subsidy schemes  Excess expenditures by local authorities,    
(for example, pharmaceuticals, housing) 0.1 institutions 0.2
Freezes on estimates and carry-forwards 0.2 Claims due to child-care benefit 0.2
Total difference from the central projection Total difference from the central projection
under extreme scenario 0.5 under extreme scenario 0.7
Demand impact under extreme scenario –1.0 Demand impact under extreme scenario +0.2
Table II-7  Risks in the central projection for the 2003 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
II.
Higher contractionary impact Lower contractionary impact
Macroeconomic developments 0.3 Macroeconomic developments 0.4
More restrictive discretionary measures and/or  Less restrictive discretionary measures 
lower offsetting effects by autonomous fiscal and/or higher offsetting effects by 
developments 0.3 autonomous fiscal developments 0.6
Temporarily lower contractionary impact  Temporarily higher contractionary impact
in 2003 0.6 in 2003 0.3
Total difference from central projection Total difference from central projection 
under extreme scenario 1.2 under extreme scenario 1.3
Demand impact under extreme scenario –2.5 Demand impact under extreme scenario 0.0
Table II-8 Risks in the central projection for the 2004 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
the Bank has considered that, apart from the revenue
impact resulting from the difference between macro-
economic developments, the contractionary impact
may be higher or lower by 0.9% of GDP. Presumably,
the larger part of this difference would affect capital
expenditures and the smaller part current expenditures
and revenue. According to previous model simulations,
on the assumption of this structure, one half the differ-
ence of the demand impact from the central projection
would be reflected in the increase/decrease in GDP
and the other half in the increase/decrease in the cur-
rent account deficit.8 The impact on inflation would be
much lower, not even amounting to 0.1 percentage
point in the year under review.
As concerns the effects on demand, the items affect-
ing household disposable income and developments
in broadly defined government fixed investment with-
in aggregate fixed investment should be treated sepa-
rately.
The Bank has revised up its forecast for general govern-
ment sector wages in 2003 relative to the previous
Report. In the current forecast, the annual average
increase in employment is 0.8%, up from 0.2%, and the
increase in average wages is 18.6%, up from 17.6%.
One reason for the revision to the forecast is that wages
in the first two months suggests that payments have
been carried forward from 2002 which may be built
into wages. The other reason is that additional measures
have been taken, such as the reclassification of admin-
istrators into civil servants, and earlier decisions, for
example, on the minimum wage of civil servants,
prompting the Bank to update its estimate.
In addition, employment in general government
increased by 1.5% in 2002, following several years of
decline. This increase picked up speed from September,
and the workforce was 4.4% larger in December com-
pared to the previous year. Employment also increased
in education, health care and public administration. In
the first two months of 2003, the rate of increase
slowed down to 4.1%. In the Bank's forecast, employ-
ment undergoes a gradual adjustment. Otherwise, the
general government wage bill sector may even rise by
18–22%.
Wages in the general government sector are forecast to
increase by around 9% in 2004. This takes into account
the full-year effect of the wage increase in the course of
this year, similarly to the forecast in the previous Report,
and assumes that wages will be raised by a half of GDP
in real terms in 2004, in addition to the effects of the
previous year's wage increase.
Transfers to households in cash are expected to in-
crease by 8.4% nominally in 2003. This, based on actu-
al data for the previous period, is some 0.6 percentage
points higher than the previous forecast. As in the
February Report, new measures affecting pensioners
(for example, a gradual increase in the 13th month pen-
sion and in widows' pension) and rising unemployment
benefits on account of an increase in unemployment
have been taken into account, in addition to the full-
year effects.9
The volume of broadly defined government fixed invest-
ment is expected to rise by around 4%–10% in 2003,
according to the CSO's recording of national accounts.
The curtailment in investment spending can be
observed less in the accruals based accounting method
and is likely to be partly offset by local authorities' 0.2%
higher investment spending as a proportion of GDP.
The larger part of the latter effect will be reflected in the
CSO's accounts for 2004. By that time, however, this
year's curtailment will also be reflected. Although the
increase in fixed investment volume in 2004 is current-
ly very uncertain, it is nevertheless expected to be
around 4%.
Household consumption, savings and fixed investment
Household consumption expenditure grew by an un-
precedented amount in 2002, due mainly to the large
increases in wages.
The Bank's current forecasts for 2003 and 2004 are deter-
mined by two opposing factors. An improving income
position as a result of more modest fiscal restriction com-
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9 In 2003 and 2004, pensions are expected to increase by 10% and 7%, respectively, based on the forecasts of the increase in net average earnings
and inflation.
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pared to previous Report contributes to the increase in
household consumption expenditure. This will be ampli-
fied by higher-than-expected wage inflation in the private
sector. Countering this effect is the rising unemployment
rate on account of slower corporate business activity,
which, in turn, reduces households' propensity to con-
sume.
Growth in household consumption expenditure was
significant in 2002, as the 10.2% rate of growth pub-
lished by the CSO was nearly twice as high as the
peak value seen in the 1990s. A massive increase in
household income from several sources was behind
this strong upsurge. First, nominal wages were quite
slow to adjust to disinflation, with the result that
household real net income grew more strongly than
expected. Second, fiscal expansion was also a factor
positively influencing households' income position.
There were rises in both average earnings and the
number of employees in the general government sec-
tor, significantly raising household income. In addition
to wages, other transfers to households, such as fam-
ily allowances and pensions, also rose strongly in
2002. The rise in the unemployment rate was an
opposing factor; however, this is only expected to
have an effect in 2003.
The estimation of consumer expenditure in 2003 Q1 is
based on retail sales and new passenger car sales,10
both of which increased strongly in 2003 Q1. In con-
trast, the GKI consumer confidence index declined to
2001 levels in a couple of months. Based on the expect-
ed further increase in unemployment and the uncer-
tainties noted above, the Bank expects an increase in
precautionary savings and consumption expenditure to
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Chart II-5 Household net income and consumption* (Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth)
* Household income equals real net income of households; consumption equals developments in consumption expenditure.
Real Consumption  Fixed 
net expenditure investment 
income* spending
2002 12.4 10.2 20–30
2003 6.6 6.6 5–10
2004 4.8 5.0 0–5
Table II-9 Household income, consumption and
investment 
(Annual percentage changes)
* Real net income has been approximated with the sum of net wage
bill and social transfers in cash.
10 Only the February data were available at the time the analysis was prepared. The missing data for March are based on statistical estimation methods. 
continue to grow at a robust pace in early 2003,
although somewhat slower than in 2002.
The Bank's forecast for 2003 are influenced by the fol-
lowing income-side effects. First, the full-year impact of
the 2002 fiscal expansion will likely continue to boost
households' disposable income in 2003. For example,
the exemption of the minimum wage from personal
income tax will have an impact throughout the period.
Moreover, in 2003 the size of fiscal restriction is likely
to be smaller than previously expected, also creating a
more favourable income position for households.
However, rising unemployment may have a negative
effect, unlike the factors noted above (for more
details, see Section 3. Labour reserves and tightness).
Due to the increasing uncertainties surrounding future
incomes, a higher unemployment rate can reduce
households' propensity to consume. According to evi-
dence from the GKI survey, households expect a rise
in unemployment, reflecting underlying public opinion
about labour market conditions. Other sentiment
indices also reflect higher uncertainty. It can be seen
that, whereas prior to the upsurge in consumption in
2002 Q1, households judged their past position as
unfavourable and their future position as favourable,
by 2003 Q1 the situation had reversed.11
Balancing the risks of higher expected incomes and ris-
ing uncertainties, the Bank has not changed its forecast
for consumption relative to the previous Report and
remains at 6.6%.
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The consumption forecast for 2004 is basically deter-
mined by three factors: while the expansion of house-
hold’s income is to be continued on the fiscal side, total
disposable income will grow at a slower pace and
unemployment is not likely to rise further.
The financial position of households may be improved by
the more modest fiscal restriction than previously expect-
ed. In light of the determinations, fiscal restriction may be
undertaken in a manner that could be expansive for
households, thereby allowing for higher consumption
expenditure. Even taking into account fiscal circum-
stances, households’ disposable income will increase at a
more modest pace. The unemployment rate is not expect-
ed to continue to rise in 2004, so this factor will not fur-
ther reduce propensity to consume. Based on the forego-
ing, consumption expenditure will likely grow slower,
broadly in line with income. In all, the Bank expects some
5% growth in consumption expenditure in 2004.
As a consequence of nearly equal growth rates in
income and consumption, the gross accumulation rate
may not change significantly relative to 2002. However,
its distribution between financial savings and accumula-
tion spending is currently uncertain. Presumably
though, the financial savings rate will rise slightly, asso-
ciated with more modest housing investment.
Future developments in housing investment will be
shaped basically by home construction. Consequently,
the number of housing completions and issued housing
permits play a special role in the Bank's forecast. The
increase in housing permits has been slowing gradually
since its peak in 2000, so the number of completions
and, consequently, household accumulation expenses
are expected to have peaked in 2001–2002.12
Actual data on home construction in 2002 was practically
identical with the Bank's estimate. The forecast of decreas-
ing housing investment is strengthened by the fact that the
number of housing completions declined in 2003 Q1.
Based on the factors discussed above, the number of new
housing permits is the most important indicator for forecast-
ing accumulation expenses. Though the actual data do not
differ materially from the Bank's previous expectation, accu-
mulation may turn out to be somewhat higher than previ-
ously estimated, due to higher incomes and more modest
propensity to consume. This, however, will remain within
the range previously forecast by the Bank (see chart II-8).
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12 The CSO releases households’ accumulation expenses in the sector's income balance sheet with a lag of around 18 months. Only actual data on 2000
were available at the time the Report was prepared. Caution is required in interpreting the information content of housing loans, as these may be spent
on purchasing used homes as well. However, in the SNA statistics only purchases of new homes can be recorded as housing investment, purchases of
used homes only represent an exchange of financial and real assets among households.
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Corporate investment
Corporate fixed investment activity may have passed its
cyclical trough in 2002, as its volume stopped declining
in Q4. In the Bank's view, the slow recovery of external
demand and the prolonged increase in domestic
demand has led to an upturn in fixed investment activi-
ty. However, the recent worsening of business expecta-
tions both in Hungary and abroad has influenced short-
term prospects negatively. Accordingly, the uncertainty
has increased in the Banks' forecast of the short-term
prospects for investment activity.
The assessment of the factors influencing investment
over the longer term, namely external demand and
competitiveness, has been maintained in broad terms.
As a result, in the Bank's current projection, corporate
fixed investment in 2003 and 2004 is virtually identical
with the forecasts contained in the previous Report.
However, over the short term, the risk of slower growth
in the forecast has increased (see table II-10).
In analysing developments in corporate fixed invest-
ment, the focus is on manufacturing investment, which
accounts for some 40% of investment by the sector.
This is explained, on the one hand, by the fact that, as a
result of its strong export-oriented nature, manufactur-
ing investment can be described in more exact terms
than market services investment which is influenced by
both domestic and external business conditions. On the
other hand, the cycles of manufacturing and corporate
sector fixed investment activity have corresponded
strongly in the past; thus the Bank's statements on man-
ufacturing can also be seen as indicative of the corpo-
rate sector as a whole.
According to the latest data, the decline in manufac-
turing investment, which lasted for two-and-a-half
years, stopped in 2002 Q4, and manufacturing invest-
ment presumably reached its cyclical pivot point
towards the end of the year. The pick-up in external
demand and, consequently, the improvement in the
prospects for output must have played a role in the
strengthening of fixed investment activity.
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Actual Forecast
2002 2003 2004
Manufacturing fixed inv. –9.2 0.5 6.8
Corporate sector fixed inv. –2.3 1.5 5.5
Table II-10 Forecasts for corporate and 
manufacturing investment (Annual
percentage growth rates
II.
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Nevertheless, the level of capacity utilisation continues
to be low, and the uneasiness observed at the end of
2002 suggests a fragile recovery in the period ahead.
The uncertainties surrounding developments in manu-
facturing investment in 2003 H1 have increased since
the February Report for two reasons. First, over the first
quarter of the year the Iraq conflict and fluctuations in
the price of oil marred international business expecta-
tions. Second, the prospects for domestic output have
not improved significantly from the extremely low level
seen at end-2002. Capacity utilisation in manufacturing
has been falling steadily, and the ratio of companies
with excess future capacities seems to be stuck at a
record level (see chart II-10).
Accordingly, the Bank expects manufacturing invest-
ments to recover only modestly in 2003 H1, despite the
lasting upturn in external demand. A more pronounced
increase may only get underway after business confi-
dence has strengthened and the capacity surplus has
been soaked up. This may occur in the second half of
the year.
The deterioration in companies' cost-based competi-
tiveness and the decline in their profitability seen in
recent years will likely affect manufacturing investment
negatively in 2003. Despite these factors, however, the
Bank expects the recovery of external demand to allow
for weak, albeit positive, growth of around 0.5% in man-
ufacturing investment in 2003. In 2004, fixed invest-
ment is expected to rise more dynamically, by around
7%, assisted by a gradual decline in the negative impact
of uncertainty and weaker competitiveness.
Actual data for fourth-quarter corporate fixed invest-
ment are also evidence of a cyclical turnaround. The
sector's fixed investment activity fell by less than manu-
facturing investment in the period 2001-2002, as a
result of a pick-up in market services investments
induced by domestic demand. The extent to which
domestic corporate investment declined and its time
pattern were comparable with the EU average.
In forecasting future prospects for corporate sector
fixed investment, the Bank expects market services
investment to continue to rise strongly, reflecting the
effects of domestic business activity. Accordingly, in the
current forecast corporate investment growth is only
slightly lower than manufacturing investment growth:
the Bank anticipates an increase of 1.5% in 2003 and
5.5% in 2004.
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Inventory investment
According to the CSO's inventory data, whole-econo-
my output inventories increased at a higher rate in
2002 Q4 than in the previous quarter. Reflecting the
cyclical slowdown, the level of inventories had been
falling since early 2001 and, apart from an upswing dri-
ven by overly optimistic expectations in 2002 Q1,
stockbuilding showed the first signs of a pick-up
towards the end of 2002. Accordingly, inventories in
the total economy may have passed their cyclical
trough, which is in line with firms' investment and out-
put developments.
However, the sectoral structure of growth in inventories
shows that the increase in Q4 was driven by stock-
building in sales, while manufacturing inventories only
stagnated. On balance, therefore, buoyant domestic
demand has been feeding the recent expansion of
stocks in the total economy, and the assessment of the
strength of external demand remains dubious.
The outturn for manufacturing stocks in 2002 Q4 reflect-
ed the sub-sector's modest economic activity and weak
business expectations. Manufacturing inventories were
virtually flat in the period under review. This is consistent
with other information available for the end of last year
which indicated a gradual slowdown in corporate activi-
ty and a decline in business confidence, following a pick-
up in manufacturing activity in early 2002. Although the
ratio of inventories to output is hardly interpretable as a
result of its long-term downward trend (see the February
Report), there are signs that firms continued to adjust
their superfluous inventories to the level of output.
In contrast with manufacturing inventories, retail invento-
ries rose very robustly towards end-2002. This suggested
a further pick-up in consumer demand, in addition to the
high growth rate of retail trade. Taken together, whole-
economy inventories were rising significantly at year-
end. This, however, suggests a strengthening of domes-
tic demand effects rather than a recovery of external
business conditions (see chart II-13).
External trade
Developments in external trade continue to be shaped
mainly by exchange rate movements and the path of
external demand, which have changed only slightly
since the previous forecast.
The current forecast, however, is significantly influ-
enced by decisions taken by firms to establish or close
down production units with large foreign trade vol-
umes as well as by methodological changes affecting
the statistical recording of goods trade, which funda-
mentally affect data both retrospectively and on the
forecast horizon.
The Bank has altered its forecasts for Hungarian for-
eign trade considerably since the previous Report.
The larger part of this, however, has been the result
of the methodological changes noted above (see
table II-11).
A comparison of the Bank's forecasts for 2003 prepared
in accordance with the old and new methodologies sug-
gests that more than three-quarters of the decline of
some 3 percentage points in the forecast for exports
has been caused by the methodological changes (2.2 of
the 2.8 percentage point decrease). As concerns
imports, the 2.5 percentage point reduction in the fore-
cast is attributable almost solely to the recent method-
ological changes.
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In terms of external demand and the real exchange rate,
there have not been any major events affecting the fore-
cast which were not included in the previous forecast.
However, decisions by firms to relocate production which
has exerted both temporary and lasting influences, mainly
affecting last year's developments, were significant. These
caused goods exports to grow at a high rate in early 2002,
despite weak external demand and the strengthening real
exchange rate. But export growth slowed down around
mid-year, followed by a slight decline in the final quarter.
Nevertheless, Hungary's market share, measured by
the country's share within total imports of the European
Union from all non-EU countries, increased further in
2002. It deserves mention, however, that the Czech
Republic and Poland, facing broadly similar external
demand and real appreciation, saw their shares of EU
imports grow more strongly in the past two years. This
was presumably related to the fact that the build-up of
higher export capacities in Hungary with foreign direct
investment occurred in the mid and late 1990s, and
thus growth in the country's market share was
strongest during that period. In the Czech Republic
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Chart II-13 Contributions to whole-economy inventory growth*
(Contributions to quarter-on-quarter annualised growth rates)
* Source of data: CSO inventory statistic at current prices, see Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics, MNB.
Under the old Under the new
CSO methodology CSO methodology
2002 2003 2002 2003
Actual February Actual Febr. Current
Report Report Report
Total
exports 6.1 6.2 3.8 4.0 3.4
o/w:
Goods trade 7.0 5.3 5.7 4.5 3.4
Total
imports 9.3 7.7 6.1 5.2 5.3
o/w:
Goods trade 7.1 7.7 4.9 5.5 5.0
Table II-11 Comparison of forecasts for external
trade based on the old and new
methodologies13
(Growth rates in percent)
13 The Manual to Hungarian Economics Statistics contains the earlier methodology of compiling GDP. For a description of the methodological changes
introduced by the CSO recently, see ‘Gross domestic product in 2001’ (A bruttó hazai termék  2001-ben), April 2003, at: http://www.ksh.hu/.
and Poland, in contrast, inflows of direct investment
capital have only gained significant momentum since
2000. In this context, slower growth in Hungary's mar-
ket share may reflect the impact of real appreciation, as
compared with the Czech Republic and Poland, where
newly introduced capacities mask this influence for the
time being.
Owing to the decisions to relocate production dis-
cussed above, Hungarian goods exports were much
lower in early 2003 than forecast in the previous
Report. These factors reduce annual average growth
by slightly more than 1 percentage point, despite the
only modest changes in the paths of external demand
and the real exchange rate. In 2004, when the effect
of relocation decisions will have disappeared from
goods export data, the rate of annual growth may rise
back to the somewhat higher growth rate in the pre-
vious forecast.
To some extent, exports of services are likely to offset
these factors, as, starting from a low base, they may
contribute significantly to GDP-based whole-economy
export growth in 2003. Even so, the Bank expects
whole-economy exports to grow at a rate which is
some 0.5 percentage points lower in 2003 and at a
marginally lower rate in 2004, relative to the previous
forecast.
The forecast for the major factors of goods imports,
apart from the real exchange rate, have been altered
much more significantly than in the case of exports.
Growth in domestic demand will likely be stronger
than previously thought, mainly on account of a rise in
fixed asset accumulation fuelled by rising domestic
economic activity. On the other hand, the relocation
decisions, discussed in connection with goods
exports, will likely influence developments in goods
imports as well, as the companies involved have been
exporting goods with import contents well exceeding
the whole-economy average.
Owing to these factors, growth in goods imports in
2003 is expected to be roughly 0.5 percentage points
lower than forecast previously. Although the rate at
which domestic demand grows will be lower in 2004
than in 2003, the growth rate of goods imports will like-
ly be considerably higher than in 2003, assisted by
stronger external and domestic economic activity and
the import needs of rising exports.
Services imports are expected to grow at a stable and
relatively slow rate on the forecast horizon, which will
speed up, and then dampen, whole-economy imports
in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
External balance
In the current forecast, net lending/net borrowing of each
sector is defined on the basis of a new methodology14 (see
chart II-16).
Based on the new methodology, the Bank has revised
up its forecast for the current account deficit in 2003 to
EUR 3.9 billion (5.1% of GDP). The external borrowing
requirement as a proportion of GDP is not expected
increase in 2004, with the current account deficit fore-
cast at EUR 4.2 billion (5.1% of GDP).
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14 Households’ net financing capacity is based on new financial accounts, external financing requirement 
Net borrowing of general government in 2003 will like-
ly fall by less than forecast in the previous Report. In
the current forecast, net lending of the private sector
falls more strongly, resulting in an increase in the exter-
nal borrowing requirement. Net savings of households
are expected to fall further slightly as a proportion of
GDP. Explanation for this is that the sector's consump-
tion, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is likely to
continue increasing, whereas its disposable income is
expected to rise less strongly. Net lending of the cor-
porate sector is expected to fall, owing to a slight
increase in its investment demand and a decline in
profitability.
The external borrowing requirement is expected to
remain stable as a proportion of GDP in 2004. Net bor-
rowing of the general government sector is likely to fall,
consistent with fiscal policy’s contractionary impact on
demand. The estimate for the fall in private sector net
lending is largely comparable with that in net borrowing
of general government. Net savings of households are
not expected to change significantly, as a result of the
slowdown in growth in consumption and investment
expenditure. Corporate sector accumulation will likely
pick up in 2004, driven by the external business cycle
entering its upward phase. However, the Bank esti-
mates that firms will retain their net lending position.
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Chart II-16 External financing requirement (As
a percentage of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Estimate Forecast
I.  General government* (–5.1) (–8.9) (–7.7) (–6.2)
II. Private sector (1.+2.) 2.3 5.2 2.8 1.4
1. Households 4.8 2.2 1.5 1.1
2. Corporate sector** (–2.5) 3.0 1.3 0.3
Financing requirement (I.+II.)*** (–2.8) (–3.7) (–5.0) (–4.7)
Current account balance (–3.4) (–4.0) (–5.1) (–5.1)
in EUR billions (–2.0) (–2.8) (–3.9) (–4.2)
Table II-12 Current account deficit and net lending/net borrowing of sectors (As a per cent of GDP)
* Specially constructed cash-flows based indicator to describe net saving position. It is different from the general government balance measures.
** Financial and non-financial corporations combined. Government spending on motorway construction is included in data on the general gov-
ernment sector.
*** The external financing requirement includes both the current and capital account balances.
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OUTPUT
Domestic output continues to be dominated by the slow
recovery of external business activity and brisk domestic
demand. However, business and household confidence
has deteriorated significantly in recent months, suggest-
ing only modest growth in output in the next quarter.
Over the long term, the lasting upturn in external
demand and the slower deterioration of competitive-
ness may lead to a robust increase in manufacturing
activity. In addition, the fall in domestic demand may
cause a slowdown in certain segments of market ser-
vices. The construction cycle has already started to
slacken this year, and a massive slowdown is expected
in 2004. On the whole, the Bank expects domestic out-
put to increase gradually in 2003 and 2004.
Gross manufacturing output rose by 3.6% in 2002. In
conjunction with the global economic slowdown,
domestic industrial output stagnated in 2001, then
resumed rising in early 2002. Accordingly, the output
cycle may have turned around at end-2001.
A comparison of German and Hungarian industrial
activity in recent years shows that, although it has been
closely aligned, output in Hungary appears to have
passed through the bottom of the trough earlier than in
Germany, unlike in earlier recessions. This is not a
Hungary-specific phenomena: industrial production
throughout the Central and Eastern European region
seems to strengthen faster than in Germany. One possi-
ble explanation for this may be that the share of goods
for further processing and investment goods exceeded
70% in the Hungarian exports in 2002, and demand for
these goods tends to increase significantly in the upward
phase of the cycle. The slight upturn in industrial pro-
duction was clearly led by exports in 2002, while despite
of the strong consumption demand, domestic sales
showed no significant increase during the year (see chart
II-17 and II-18).
Hungarian industrial activity weakened slightly in early
2003 relative to its slow but steady growth last year.
This slowdown was partly due to a decline in business
confidence. In line with international expectations,
domestic corporate expectations deteriorated signifi-
cantly late last year and stabilised at this subdued level
in the first quarter of 2003. In addition, as the past few
months have seen a steady worsening in both German
and euro-area confidence indices, it is unlikely that
Hungary will experience any major improvement in
business confidence over the first six months of 2003.
Similarly to the investment projection, there is consider-
able uncertainty regarding the short-term evolution of
the industrial business cycle. Based on January and
February data for industrial production, the Bank
expects production growth to slacken somewhat in
2003 Q1 and Q2.15 An upswing on a scale similar to
that seen in 2002 is only likely to occur in the latter half
of the year. Output growth in 2003 will likely be affect-
ed by approximately 1 percentage point due to the loss
of competitiveness which has already occurred, result-
ing in an overall growth rate of 3.6%. In 2004, industri-
al production is projected to grow by roughly 6.3%,
thanks to a steady pick-up in external demand and
stronger business confidence.
15 The preliminary data on March industrial production (which arrived after this Report was finalised) show no clear sign of a slowdown. However, indus-
trial production in the first quarter of the year has been pushed up by the dynamic growth of the energy sector as a result of the unusually cold weath-
er in that period. The growth of manufacturing production may significantly fall behind that of the industrial sector.
Actual Forecast
2002 2003 2004
Gross
manufacturing
output 3.6 3.6 6.3
Manufacturing
value added* 0.5 3.3 4.4
Market services
value added  4.1 4.0 3.9
Construction
industry
value added 14.8 10.0 2.0
Table II-13 Output projection (Percentage
changes on a year earlier)
* Time series adjusted in 2002 Q3–Q4.
Information from the Central Statistical Office (CSO)
shows that manufacturing value added grew at an
exceptionally high rate in the second half of 2002. This
growth in value added, considerably exceeding gross
production, does not seem to be supported by business
trends, and developments in both exports and employ-
ment would point to slower growth. One explanation
for the widening gap between value added and gross
production may be the reallocation effect, namely the
flight of low value added activity, together with a
strengthening of high value added production. How-
ever, at the disaggregation level, the Bank found evi-
dence of neither phenomena. At the same time, the
Bank is unaware of any information that would explain
the widening gap on a statistical or methodological
basis. Taking into account the foregoing considerations,
the Bank has decided to ignore the CSO’s Q3 and Q4
data on manufacturing value added in preparing its pro-
jections. Instead, estimates with gross output-based cor-
rections are offered. Thus corrected, manufacturing
value added is forecast to stand at 3.3% and 4.4% in
2003 and 2004, respectively (see chart II-19).
Value added of market services slightly exceeded the
Bank’s expectations in 2002 Q4, which can be attributed
to vigorous consumption demand. Market services-
related value added increased by 4.1% in 2002.
Domestic demand-driven trade grew more and trans-
port, which moves together mostly with industrial busi-
ness cycles, less markedly. The Bank’s projection con-
tinues to anticipate a strong domestic business cycle in
2003. Looking forward to 2004, consumption demand
is likely to be replaced with a recovering industrial
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Chart II-18 Volume of domestic and export
sales of manufacturing
business cycle. Accordingly, market services are fore-
cast to increase by 4% and 3.9% in 2003 and 2004,
respectively.
Construction industry value added increased by 15%
in 2002. The housing market boom and a pick-up in
government fixed investment explained this salient out-
turn. A good illustration of last year's performance,
building construction and construction of other struc-
tures surged by 15% and 28%, respectively, in the year
under review. In the final quarter, however, growth fal-
tered, with building construction stagnating and other
construction (e.g. road, railway and water structures)
declining (see chart II-21).
Information available on construction activity in
early 2003 suggests a further slowdown in output in
the months ahead. The volume of output fell by 10%
in the first two months of the year, and the number
of new contracts stagnated at 70% of the level of a
year earlier. The Bank's long-term forecast is based
on its projec-tions for home-building and govern-
ment fixed investment (essentially motorway con-
struction).
The Bank expects the housing boom to remain robust
in 2003, before slowing in 2004. In the current forecast,
government fixed investment rises slowly and at a mod-
erating pace. In the Bank's view, the current strong per-
formance may result in a nearly 10% annual growth in
construction industry value added in 2003, followed by
a drop to 2% in 2004.
42 THE MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
II. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
PercentPercent
Trade and tourism Transport, storage and communications Financial services
99
:Q
1
99
:Q
4
99
:Q
2
99
:Q
3
00
:Q
1
00
:Q
4
00
:Q
2
00
:Q
3
01
:Q
1
01
:Q
4
01
:Q
2
01
:Q
3
02
:Q
1
02
:Q
4
02
:Q
2
02
:Q
3
Chart II-20 Decomposition of service sector value added growth
(Contribution to annualised quarterly growth)
II.
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
95
:Q
1
95
:Q
4
96
:Q
3
97
:Q
2
98
:Q
1
98
:Q
4
99
:Q
3
00
:Q
2
01
:Q
1
01
:Q
4
02
:Q
3
03
:Q
2
04
:Q
1
04
:Q
4
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Percent
Manufacturing value added
Manufacturing gross output
Percent
Chart II-19 Manufacturing output and value
added (Annualised quarter-on-quar-
ter growth rates)
43QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
II. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
98
:Q
1
98
:Q
2
98
:Q
3
98
:Q
4
99
:Q
1
99
:Q
2
99
:Q
3
99
:Q
4
00
:Q
1
00
:Q
2
00
:Q
3
00
:Q
4
01
:Q
1
01
:Q
2
01
:Q
3
01
:Q
4
02
:Q
1
02
:Q
2
02
:Q
3
02
:Q
4
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Percent
Buildings Other
Percent
Chart II-21 Construction output by main groups* (1998=100)
* ‘Other’ contains road, railway and water structures
II.

III. LABOUR MARKET AND COMPETITIVENESS

In the period between 2001 and 2004, labour market
processes have been and will be subject to the delayed
effects of the external cyclical slowdown, the conse-
quences of forint appreciation and the impact of a con-
siderable rise in the minimum wage in 2001–2002.16
The extent to which the individual effects have influ-
enced and will influence these processes is difficult to
gauge separately.
International experience shows that the labour market
reacts to factors influencing its operation with some
delay. As presented in detail in the Bank’s successive
Reports prepared after the widening of the exchange
rate band, both the manner and extent of labour mar-
ket adjustment are of key importance in terms of the
real economic costs of the process of disinflation. The
Bank suggested that enterprises were likely to react to
any rise in the relative cost of labour by employment
reduction if the adjustment of wage-setting practices to
lower inflation became a protracted process. As a
result, output might also decline, and growth might fall
victim to disinflation to a larger extent. It seems that
current labour market processes fall into this pattern of
trends. Despite the process of disinflation, the past 18
months have seen a fast increase in nominal wages,
which have only decelerated slightly in the private sec-
tor, with moderate labour demand and unemployment
on the rise.
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MNB Projection MNB Projection
estimate estimate
February Report Current Report
2001 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004
Manufacturing
Employment** –0.7 –2.0 –1.3 –0.2 –1.9 –1.8 –0.6
Wage inflation** 14.4 11.9 6.9 4.9 11.8 7.5 5.4
ULC*** 9.8 7.9 1.1 0.3 7.6 0.9 –0.1
Market services
Employment** 2.9 1.4 1.0 0.3 1.6 1.0 0.1
Wage inflation** 14.8 13.6 8.7 5.8 13.7 9.9 7.4
ULC*** 11.3 9.3 4.6 1.9 9.3 6.0 3.6
Private sector
Employment** 1.1 –0.3 –0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.4 –0.2
Wage inflation** 14.6 12.9 7.8 5.4 12.8 8.8 6.5
ULC*** 10.4 8.4 2.9 1.2 8.2 3.5 1.9
Table III-1 Summary labour market indicators (Percentage changes on a year earlier)*
* Annual average changes often fail to reflect actual processes faithfully owing to base effects. Level- and short-based (e.g. quarter-on-quarter) indi-
cators in the relevant sub-chapters offer a more accurate picture.
** Computed from CSO figures on the basis of the Bank’s own estimates (See Manual to Hungarian Economics Statistics).
*** ULC: Nominal increase in labour cost per unit (value added) in forints.
16 The entire Chapter III. has been devoted to the private sector. Employment and wage developments in the government sector are presented in Chapter
II., Fiscal Stance.
III.
Fiscal policy, which was expansive last year and is
expected to be slightly restrictive this year and in 2004,
has manifested itself partly in a dramatic rise in public
sector wages, which may function as an example for the
private sector, especially, for market services.
However, since the second half of 2002, wage adjust-
ment in certain parts of the private sector has seemed
be occurring faster than what was seen earlier. Wage
increase in manufacturing has been conspicuously
slower. But, according to the latest (February) data,
the downward tendency in manufacturing wage infla-
tion has become uncertain. At the same time, wage
inflation has been stagnating at a high level in market
services.
The most recent business surveys by TÁRKI suggest that
inflation expectations and planned wage increases have
weakened compared to the previous period.
In sum, the Bank has increased its earlier 7.8% wage
inflation projection for 2003 to 8.8%, as recent data
reveal no discernible signs of a significant slowdown in
wage inflation in market services. Moreover, as noted
above, nor do the February data suggest a marked slow-
down in manufacturing wages. The Bank has also
increased its earlier 5.5% projection for 2004 to 6.5 %,
as now it expects less rapid wage adjustment. Special
importance has been attached to the adverse effects of
real appreciation on corporate profitability and the
increase in labour reserves in the projection.
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No major changes have occurred in labour usage
trends since the previous Report. The average number
of working hours, which measures the intensity of
labour usage, is usually a reliable indicator of develop-
ments in business cycles. In manufacturing, the average
number of hours worked by manual workers remained
nearly the same at end-2002 and early this year.17
Relying on the data available at the time of preparing
the previous Report, the Bank did not rule out that, in
line with developments in external demand and manu-
facturing output, there had been a turnaround in the
development of working hours. This has not, however,
been evidenced by the most recent data available on
working hours. The latest information available on pro-
duction, too, points to the uncertainty of a short-term
business cycle outlook.
Labour demand in the private sector increased slightly
in the final months of 2002.18 However, seeing that
employment is somewhat late in responding to cyclical
changes, no significant changes in employment are pro-
jected for either 2003 or 2004 in the private sector
overall. The Bank’s projection allows for the latest
research results which indicate that, although the short-
term labour market behaviour of Hungarian companies
has become more or less similar to that of corporations
in developed market economies, such behaviour is still
likely to be unstable in the long run. This means that the
labour demand of enterprises begins adjusting to declin-
ing output relatively quickly, while the growth elasticity
of such demand is rather low.19 As a result, the lacklus-
tre economic growth in 2001–2002 may easily have fur-
ther future repercussions on employment.
The decline in demand for labour force in manufacturing
continued. As a result, the level of employment and total
number of hours worked diminished further.20 At pre-
sent, the delayed effects of cyclical slowdown, the
impact of rises in the minimum wage pushing up the
actual level of wages, a rapid rise in labour costs and, to
some extent, deteriorating competitiveness that can be
attributed to the forint exchange rate appreciation have
combined to shape these employment trends in the sec-
tor.
Last year’s employment reduction in manufacturing
shows substantial sectoral differences. There are two
sectors, which the Bank views as labour-intensive,
where employment has been falling significantly since
mid-2001 – one is textile and clothing, and the other is
metallurgy (basic metals and fabricated metal products);
(see chart III-2).
The Bank has made a slight downward modification of
its manufacturing employment projection for 2003
compared to the previous Report. This is because dete-
riorating competitiveness and a rise in the relative price
of labour appear to be holding employment slightly
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LABOUR USAGE
* Statistical methods were used to recalculate data for businesses
employing over 5 people (source of basic data: CSO). Factual data
were used for the period leading to February, whereas statistical
methods were employed to estimate March data.
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Chart III-1 Average weekly hours worked by
manual workers in manufacturing*
17 CSO factual data were used for the period leading to February, whereas statistical methods were employed to estimate March data.
18 Early private sector employment figures in labour statistics are tentative, with late corrections being the order of the day. Data on the first few months
and/or Q1 are rather ‘noisy’. When seasonally adjusted, they often prove to be ‘outliers’. Therefore, data cannot be properly evaluated on either mar-
ket services, or the aggregate level of the private sector on the basis of the January-February 2003 figures.
19 G. Kôrösi, Corporate labour demand, Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 3/2000; G. Kôrösi, Labour Adjustment and Efficiency in Hungary,
Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 4/2002.
20 Based on institutional labour statistics.
more firmly in check than expected. The Bank’s previous
projection already allowed for the employment reduc-
tion that took place early this year. Judging from mass
layoffs planned for the coming months and anecdotal
information, employment is likely to fall more signifi-
cantly throughout the year than projected by the Bank.
Though data on external demand and production sug-
gest that there has already been a turnaround in the busi-
ness cycle in manufacturing, employment in manufac-
turing is likely to remain unchanged rather than take off
even in 2004, owing to the delayed impacts of the busi-
ness cycle, the dampening effect of the currency's real
appreciation on economic activities in general as well as
the low degree of growth elasticity of labour demand
(see chart III-3).
Due to the strong conditions in the domestic business
cycle, employment and the number of working hours in
the market services sector increased slightly more
markedly at end-2002 than expected earlier. By con-
trast, in 2003 a slower rise in consumer demand and
high unit labour costs are likely to put a brake on the
dynamic increase in employment in the market services
sector. Anecdotal information from early 2003 about
major planned layoffs also point to a more moderate
increase in employment. In line with its previous pro-
jection, the Bank expects employment to remain flat in
the market services sector in 2004, reflecting stagnating
economic growth.
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Since mid-2002 the economy has seen a steady expan-
sion of labour reserves. The unemployment rate
increased in the second half of last year and early this
year.21 Similar tendencies are discernible in unemploy-
ment registered by labour offices. Unemployment has
not grown in the Hungarian economy since 1992. In the
years after that, downward pressure on labour demand
tended to manifest itself in growing inactivity. In 2002,
the employment rate rose somewhat along with rising
unemployment, resulting in a slightly increased rate of
economic activity.22
The current level of the unemployment rate is not con-
sidered high by international standards. In the first
quarter of 2003, the unemployment rate was 6.2%,
which for instance was 1.9% lower than the rate in the
European Union in February. Nevertheless, the degree
of economic activity in the working age population is
quite low in Hungary. However, according to
research, inactive people cannot necessarily be con-
sidered as effective labour reserves in terms of
restraining wage inflation.23 The number of persons affected by announced mass
redundancies increased significantly in November 2002
and February 2003. As presented in the previous
Report, it is safe to assume that the rise in the number
of planned redundancies can, in part, be attributed to
the delayed effects of the slowdown in the global busi-
ness cycle. Furthermore, labour costs increasing far in
excess of productivity growth and deteriorating com-
petitiveness induced by real appreciation may also have
contributed to this rise.24
No sectoral breakdown of planned mass redundancies
is available. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests
that, while planned employment reduction primarily
affected manufacturing activity late last year, significant
staff cuts were planned early this year in certain ser-
vices, for example, in telecommunications and financial
services, as well as the energy sector. Meanwhile, the
number of reported unfilled vacancies has decreased
slightly (see chart III-6 and III-7).
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21 Based on CSO’s Labour Survey (ILO definition).   
22 In part, this may also be accounted for by the fact that there was no female age group which, pursuant to statutory regulations for the transition period
following the raise in the retirement age, reached the age of retirement.
23 B. Ferenczi, Labour Market Developments in Hungary from a Central Bank Perspective, MNB Working Papers, 5/1999.
24 However, it should be noted that, on the whole, the level of the indicator is very low, hence it is rather susceptible to such announcements.
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Chart III-5 Changes in registered unemployment*
* Based on Employment Office data.
The data clearly suggest that labour market tightness has
been easing recently, which in turn can curb wage infla-
tion. On the basis of the anticipated developments in
labour demand and the labour force, unemployment is
expected to continue to rise in 2003 and stagnate in 2004
(see chart III-8).
Whether cyclical unemployment would later be ab-
sorbed owing to an upswing in business activity or to
what extent it is likely to transform itself into permanent
structural unemployment (known as the hysteresis phe-
nomenon) depends on labour market flexibility.
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Since the second half of last year there have been
signs in the private sector that the process of adjust-
ing wage-setting practices to lower inflation has accel-
erated. Nevertheless, average wage inflation in the
private sector in 2002 stood at 12.8% compared to
14.6% in 2001.
In 2002, real wages increased far more than productiv-
ity growth mainly because the inflation expectations of
enterprises decreased slowly, despite the disinflation
process. According to the latest survey results, the pull
effect of considerable wage raises in the public sector
was a further possible reason for the significant wage
increase in the private sector.25 Survey results also indi-
cate that the impact of rises in the minimum wage
boosting the actual level of wages was concentrated
mainly in certain industries and groups of enterprises.26
In 2003, however, these measures are likely to influ-
ence wage increases by indirect effects.
In formulating its 2003 wage inflation projection, as in
the previous Report the Bank assumed that businesses’
nominal wage adjustment to lower inflation would be
stronger this year. This is because the significant
increase in labour costs over the past two years has led
to lower corporate competitiveness, which, combined
with modest economic growth and disinflation, may
leave enterprises more reluctant to raise wages this
year.
The Bank has raised its wage projection of 7.8% in its
February Report to 8.8%. Note that even in the higher
forecast the actual (quarter-on-quarter) rate of wage
inflation drops significantly. Upward pressure on wage
inflation projection has been generated by the fact
that, considering February figures, the current projec-
tion assumes a somewhat slower path for wage adjust-
ment than the previous Report.
In formulating its forecast for wages, the Bank also
allowed for the fact that the easing of market labour
tightness and rising unemployment would put a brake
on wages. TÁRKI’s most recent (April) survey also sug-
gests that, concurrently with lower inflation expecta-
tions, the extent of planned wages increases at busi-
ness enterprises over the next 12 months is smaller
compared to what it was in January.
The Bank has revised up its wage projection of 5.5% for
2004 to 6.5%. The underlying reason for such a sub-
stantial modification was this year’s more sluggish wage
adjustment. At the same time, however, in preparing
the forecast, the Bank also allowed for the adverse
effects of real appreciation that had materialised on cor-
porate profitability and an envisaged increase in labour
market reserves.
Looking at developments by major sectors, in accor-
dance with the Bank's expectations, wage inflation has
abated considerably since the second half of 2002,
mainly in manufacturing. Here, profits earned from
WAGE INFLATION
25 É. Palócz–I. J. Tóth, Components of the wage growth in 2002 and expected wage raise for 2003 on the basis of a corporate survey, Kopint-Datorg –
MKIK GVI, February 2003  (http://www.gvi.hu/)
26 For this reason, labour cost increased mainly for medium or large enterprises in Hungarian ownership with considerable proportion of exports in sales.
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exports have dwindled significantly over the past two
years owing to slack external business activity, the appre-
ciation of the exchange rate of the forint and real labour
costs increasing far in excess of productivity growth.
The Bank has only slightly raised its projection of
around 7% average wage inflation in manufacturing in
2003. Due to the aforementioned factors, economic
constraints holding nominal wage increase in check are
likely to prove rather strong, which may in turn lead to
a further marked decline in wage inflation in 2003. The
Bank assumes that, similar to what happens in the case
of a cyclical slowdown, there will also be a lag in the
effects of an upswing in external demand on wage-set-
ting behaviour, and thus rules out more vigorous wage
growth in this sector in 2004.
For the time being, no signs indicating significantly
lower wage inflation are discernible in market services.
The Bank presumes that stagnating wage inflation is
closely related to buoyant consumer demand in particu-
lar, as well as the demonstrative effect of strong 
growth in public sector wages. Allowing for the fact that
wage inflation has stagnated at a high level recently, the
Bank has raised its projection for wage inflation in mar-
ket services in 2003 by 1.2% to approximately 10%.
This projection continues to be based on the assump-
tion that actual (quarter-on-quarter) wage dynamics in
the sector lose momentum in the course of the year;
however, the pace of such slowdown is more sluggish
than forecast in earlier projections. Due to the spillover
effects of the higher wage increases in 2003, the Bank
has also raised its projection for wages in market ser-
vices in 2004 relative to its previous Report.
In the Bank’s view, the uncertainties surrounding the
centrally projected path of wage inflation are symmetri-
cal. Wage inflation exceeding the Bank’s basic projec-
tion may emerge if major changes in the wage-setting
practice of firms take longer to occur than expected, in
part, owing to persistently high inflation expectations. If,
however, unemployment rises at a faster-than-expected
rate, that will represent a downside risk to the central
projection for wage inflation.
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The growth rate of the private sector unit labour costs
decelerated considerably in 2002. The declining rate of
growth was generated by a rise in demand and better pro-
ductivity on the one hand, and a decrease in the rate of
wage increases on the other. In the Bank’s view, the mod-
erate growth in unit labour costs (ULC) put an end to the
downward trend in corporate profitability at end-2002.
The forecast assumes growth in private sector nominal
ULC of 3.6% and 1.9% in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
Unit labour costs in manufacturing are expected to
grow relatively slower, by roughly 1% and 0% in 2003
and 2004, while ULC in market services are anticipated
to rise by 6% and 3.6%, respectively.
In parallel with lower manufacturing ULC, the Bank also
forecasts that foreign unit labour costs will be lower in the
following years. Consequently, the cost competitiveness
of manufacturing companies does not differ significantly
from the previous forecast. Accordingly, the Bank
expects the ULC-based real exchange rate to depreciate
by 3.3 percent in 2003 and by 0.7 percent in 2004 (Q4
indices). On the other hand, price-based competitiveness
will deteriorate in the following years, as a result of the
slow approximation of domestic inflation to the EU level.
Declining external demand, exchange rate appreciation
since mid-2001 and a steep rise in wages have reduced
corporate profitability over the past two years. Though
consumer demand has remained high, an increase in the
minimum wage has resulted in upside pressure on the
cost side in the market service sector. Consequently, as
early as late 2001 the Bank already assumed that com-
panies would begin to adjust to the situation (see the
November 2001 Report). However, this process has
taken longer than expected. In addition, a considerable
portion of the adjustment of labour costs materialised
through employment reduction.
In 2002, unit labour costs only increased slightly in both
manufacturing and market services. Stronger business
activity in manufacturing and continuing cuts in the work-
UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
* Changes in the rate of profit have been approximated by the inverse of changes in (real) unit labour costs deflated by the price index of traded goods.
In fact, the category included in the chart denotes a term whose meaning is narrower than that of the rate of profit, for it does not comprise cost ele-
ments (e.g. the costs of intermediate products) other than labour.
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Chart III-11 Productivity, wages and profit in manufacturing (Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
force resulted in a considerable improvement in produc-
tivity. Furthermore, in the second half of the year the
increase in wages tapered off. The Bank feels that, as a
result of this slowdown, the deterioration in corporate
profitability, which had been declining continuously since
year-end 2000, came to a halt by Q4 (see chart III-11).
As a result of employment expansion, productivity in
market services improved more slowly than in manu-
facturing, despite the fact that consumer demand gen-
erated a steady increase of approximately 4% in output.
Wage adjustment, however, was slow and consequent-
ly unit labour costs in Q4 still increased twice as fast as
manufacturing ULC. Nevertheless, corporate profitabili-
ty improved in 2002 H2, primarily owing to higher mar-
ket services inflation.
In the projection for domestic unit labour costs, the
Bank assumed that productivity would increase and fur-
ther adjustment of wage costs would occur in both sec-
tors. In respect of private sector unit labour costs, the
MNB expects growth to amount to 3% and 0.7% in
2003 and 2004, respectively (see chart III-13).
The cost-based external competitivness of manufactur-
ing continued to deteriorate slightly in 2002 Q4. While
domestic unit labour costs only increased moderately,
foreign wage costs rose at a slower-than-expected rate.
Thus, the 2.7% appreciation in the effective exchange
rate of the Hungarian forint led to deteriorating com-
petitiveness. In total, the ULC-based real exchange rate
has appreciated by approximately 16% over the past
two years.
Relative to the forecast in the February Report, there
has been no significant change in the projection for
manufacturing competitiveness. The Bank maintains
its assumption that domestic unit labour costs will
remain roughly the same, while foreign unit labour
costs will increase. Accordingly, competitiveness is
likely to improve in the coming period–real deprecia-
tion is projected at 3.3% and 1% in 2003 and 2004,
respectively (see chart III-14).
Price-based competitiveness deteriorated significantly
in the last months of 2002, due to the strong year-end
appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate.
The CPI-based real exchange rate has appreciated by
approximately 13% since the widening of the band. As
the growth rate of prices in the sector competing in for-
eign trade was moderate, the price competitiveness of
manufacturing declined less markedly, by approximate-
ly 7%, than that of the whole economy. In early 2003,
due to the weakening of the nominal exchange rate, price-
based competitiveness did not deteriorate considerably.
Over the long run, however, the Bank expects an annu-
al real appreciation of 3% as a result of the slow disap-
pearance of inflation differences (see chart III-15).
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* Changes in profits have been approximated by the inverse of changes
in (real) unit labour costs deflated by the price index of market services.
In fact, the category included in the chart denotes a term whose mean-
ing is narrower than that of the rate of profit, for it does not comprise
cost elements (e.g. the costs of intermediate products) other than
labour.
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* The number of people included in the reports filed in a given quar-
ter to the Employment Office (Source: Employment Office).
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In small open economies such as Hungary, external
demand for domestic assets is heavily influenced not
just by domestic macroeconomic developments, but
by the global economic environment, especially
changes in returns on alternative assets and the ‘risk
appetite’ of investors, as well. Through their effect on
capital flows, these factors may influence the forint’s
exchange rate and domestic yields, which must be
taken into account when reaching monetary policy
decisions. Therefore, in the Inflation Reports, the MNB
tries to assess recent and prospective changes in the
external environment (focusing predominantly on euro-
zone yields) and in risk sentiment (regarding both
developed and emerging markets, as well as the CEE
region and Hungary itself).
The downward trend in global risk indicators, first seen
in last autumn, continued in 2003 Q1. The EMBI
spread, regarded as the most widely used indicator of
global ‘risk appetite’, sank below 600 basis points in
April, a very low figure compared to recent years. There
was a similar drop in the spreads on US and European
bonds with a higher risk rating. This suggests that recent
optimistic investor sentiment about higher-risk invest-
ments, including those in emerging markets, has
remained unbroken. This sustained interest is due pri-
marily to the worsening performance of overseas stock
markets and the low level of interest rates in the US and
Europe, which have led investors to look for higher-
yielding instruments. Another factor is that the percep-
tion of some emerging countries has improved (thanks
IV. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND RISK PERCEPTION
* S&P Speculative Grade Credit Spread (bp).
** MAGGIE – Index of euro-denominated government and corporate bonds and mortgage bonds (bp), computed by JP Morgan-Chase.
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to financial reform in Brazil and the IMF aid to Turkey,
for instance). In contrast with previous market expecta-
tions, the military conflict in Iraq has not caused the risk
perception of emerging markets to worsen, partly
because rising oil prices had a beneficial effect on the
perception of a number of emerging oil exporter coun-
tries. The uncertainty felt at the time of the outbreak of
the war was reflected in certain indicators, but as soon
as the allies commenced operations and the first news
of success appeared, the indicators resumed their
downward trend, reflecting investor expectations of a
rapid end to the war (see chart IV-1).
One of the main reasons why investors turned from the
advanced markets towards emerging countries was the
string of unfavourable news and forecasts of a global
economic slowdown. These included the April projec-
tion by the IMF with a downward revision of global
economic growth for 2003 of 0.5 percentage points.
The IMF forecast that any major recovery in growth
would only start in 2004. Virtually all major economic
regions faced a negative outlook for 2003, with pro-
jections for developed country growth revised down
by 0.3–1.5 percentage points. Thus, the downward
revisions to economic growth in the United States and
the euro area were 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points,
respectively.
Against such a background, the ECB’s 25-basis-point
interest rate cut in early March did not come as a sur-
prise for European money markets. Market participants
had already incorporated the move into their prices.
Expectations of interest rate reduction had gained
momentum in the second half of February, after the
release of data reflecting sluggish European activity. In
addition to the poor macroeconomic performance,
higher geopolitical uncertainty was also one of the fac-
tors behind the stronger expectations. Due to poor eco-
nomic performance last year and in early 2003, as well
as the protracted effects of the appreciation of the euro
against the US dollar in 2002, the ECB perceived no
signs of any serious risk to inflation. However, expecta-
tions of further interest rate cuts have cooled down as
inflation in the euro area remained unchanged in March
(at 2.4%). Information currently available27 suggests that
market participants do not expect interest rate cuts in
excess of 25 basis points for the remainder of 2003 (see
chart IV-2).
Hungarian financial markets have remained virtually
unaffected by the accession-related developments tak-
ing place in Central and Eastern Europe since the publi-
cation of the February Report. The approval of the reso-
lution passed by the Copenhagen summit on 12–13
December, inviting the ten accession countries to be-
IV. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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Sources: Reuters, ECB.
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come members of the European Union, removed virtu-
ally all obstacles to accession in 2004, putting an end to
the uncertainty about the date. While passing this reso-
lution probably improved the perception of investing in
these countries, the subsequent referenda held in
Malta, Slovenia and Hungary appeared to have no per-
ceptible effect on either Hungarian yields or the
exchange rate of the forint.
The political crises affecting some countries in Central
and Eastern Europe in previous years had an adverse
impact on the risk perception of the region as a whole,
reflecting in a depreciation of the three main currencies
over this period. However, developments in March
2003 point to a slight change in investor sentiment 
regarding this region. Although the exchange rate of the
forint moved in strong correlation with that of the
Czech crown and the zloty during the Iraq crisis, the
political turbulence in Poland and the Czech Republic
has had no lasting or dramatic effect on the forint’s
exchange rate.
Consistent with the above analysis, the period under
review witnessed no significant change in the risk percep-
tion of the Hungarian government, with the spread in
euro-denominated Hungarian government bonds remain-
ing around a historical low of 40 basis points ever since
publication of the February Report. This suggests that the
January re-valuation speculation had no profound or long-
lasting effect on country risk (see chart IV-3).
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During the one and a half months following the re-valu-
ation speculation on 15-16 January, the MNB’s interest
rate and exchange rate policy was primarily aimed at
restoring normal business operations and stabilising
monetary conditions. These efforts have proved to be
successful. With a more active presence in foreign
exchange markets, the Bank was able to make the
majority of the speculative capital leave the Hungarian
banking system without threatening the stability of the
forint’s exchange rate. In addition, by restoring the for-
mer set-up of central bank instruments (the ±1% width
of the overnight interest rate corridor, no quantity limits
on the two-week deposit facility), it was possible to put
an end to the instability that had begun to manifest itself
at the short end of the yield curve.
The exchange rate of the forint has been exceptionally
stable ever since early February, staying in a range of
±1% around a rate of HUF 245 per euro. This volatility
appears to be quite low both historically and compared
to that of the major currencies of Central and Eastern
Europe (such as the Polish zloty and the Czech crown)
observed during the same period. Regional and global
political events, such as the Polish government crisis
and the resulting significant weakening of the zloty, or
news about the Iraq war, have triggered only minor
movements in the exchange rate (see chart IV-4).
This stability of the forint can be attributed to two fac-
tors. One key factor has been the successful resolution
of the contradiction between the level of the exchange
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rate seen in the aftermath of fending off the re-valuation
speculation and the inflation target for 2003. In its state-
ment published in the February Report, the Monetary
Council announced that due to recent developments
and the constraint posed by the exchange rate band,
the rate of inflation in 2003 would probably be above
the target range. On the other hand, based on the
assumption of an exchange rate of HUF 245 per euro
at the Council’s request, the inflation projection for end-
2004 indicated a tolerable level within the target range.
In subsequent statements, the Council also pointed out
that this exchange rate, with other conditions also taken
into account, appeared to be at a level sufficient for
meeting the inflation target in 2004. These statements
provided the market with verbal reassurance on several
occasions about the level of the exchange rate, viewed
not as desirable per se, but rather as consistent with the
Bank’s inflation targeting strategy now focussing on the
target for 2004.
The other key factor lending stability to the forint was
the Bank’s active participation in foreign exchange mar-
kets. The over five billion euros that had poured into
central bank overnight deposits during the re-valuation
speculation posed a significant risk to stability, and
would have pushed up sterilisation costs at the time of
restoring the effective level of interest rates from 3.5%
to 6.5% (see below). The Bank held auctions and used
other market solutions in January to speed up the out-
flow of foreign capital. The MNB’s presence in the for-
eign exchange market is presumed to be one of the
contributory factors to the low volatility of the forint’s
exchange rate, as by selling euros, the Bank prevented
potential depreciation.
In response to the re-valuation speculation, the Bank
reduced the interest rates sharply. During the two days of
the attack, the two-week deposit rate on the policy instru-
ment was lowered by 200 basis points to 6.5%. At the
same time, the effective reduction in the central bank rate
was even larger due to a quantity limit imposed on the
two-week deposits, equivalent to an average of the
amounts deposited before the attack. Thus, only the
overnight deposits, offering lower rates, absorbed the
inflow of excess liquidity without any restrictions. Hence
the overnight deposit became the effective central bank
instrument. However, the yield on this instrument was
also reduced when the overnight interest rate corridor
was widened around the two-week deposit rate from ±1
to ±3 percentage points, bringing the total reduction in
effective yields to 500 basis points (see chart IV-5).
This large interest rate cut implemented by the central
bank was naturally also reflected in the development of
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short-term market rates. However, it was clear from the
beginning that market participants perceived part of the
reduction in effective rates from 8.5% to 3.5% as tem-
porary, expecting the effective central bank rate to rise
to 6.5% within a short time, once the limits placed on
the amount of two-week deposits were lifted. Ac-
cordingly, commercial bank deposit and lending rates
followed only the 200 basis-point drop in the two-week
central bank deposit rate, in addition to the effect of the
50-basis-point cuts in November and December, which
were also incorporated at that time. Yields on short-
term government securities also reflected the tempo-
rary nature of the reduction. Even though three-month
yields fell sharply, 6- and 12-month yields indicated sig-
nificantly higher interest rate expectations, based on the
assumption that the original central bank instruments
would be restored. The Bank gained valuable time
thanks to market participants’ view of the rate cut as
being temporary. Consequently, the Bank was able to
facilitate the outflow of the speculative capital by selling
euros, while causing the least possible disturbance in
the market.
However, by mid-February, considerable uncertainty
had emerged about the likely date of restoring the orig-
inal central bank instruments. With the patience of
banking sector and money market participants exhaust-
ed, 6- to 12-month yields had started to fall. As, by then,
a large portion of the foreign speculative capital had
been withdrawn from the country, at its meeting on 24
February, the Monetary Council decided to remove the
quantity limit imposed on the two-week deposits and
restore the overnight interest rate corridor to its pre-
attack width of ±1%. This move returned the central
bank instruments to their state before the re-valuation
speculation, with the 6.5% two-week deposit rate again
becoming the key policy rate.
Restoring the original set of instruments has terminated
the uncertainty surrounding the central bank’s interest
rate policy, quickly leading to a spectacular stabilisation
of short-term rates in the range of 6% to 6.5%. The yield
curve has assumed a nearly horizontal shape, unseen in
recent years. This also means that the market does not
expect the average rate on the two-week central bank
deposit to change this year, an expectation also con-
firmed by Reuters’ latest survey of macroanalysts. At the
same time, this stability implies a much lower level of
interest rates than before the re-valuation speculation.
Based on Reuters’ latest, April, survey of analysts’ aver-
age inflation expectations for 2003, the one-year ex
ante real interest rate, currently at a level of 1.7%,
remains low. The combination of the nearly horizontal
shape of the yield curve and the less-than-one-percent-
age-point lower inflation expectations for end-2004
imply that over the next twelve months market partici-
pants expect no significant tightening in the real interest
rate component of monetary conditions. This means
that the current extremely low level of real interest rates
is expected to rise only slowly (see chart IV-7).
In addition to the low volatility of the spot exchange
rate of the forint, another noteworthy development
has been the steady increase of expectations of a
future appreciation ever since late January. The
Reuters surveys indicate that since the weakening of
the forint in the wake of the re-valuation speculation,
macroanalysts have expected the exchange rate to
approach the strong edge of the band gradually, at
HUF 240 per euro at end-2003 and HUF 235 per euro
at end-2004. However, despite the higher average
expectations of tighter monetary conditions in terms
of the real exchange rate, the market’s current
exchange rate expectations are 1%–1.5% lower than
they were in January (see chart IV-8).
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Chart IV-8 Forint/euro spot exchange rate and market exchange rate expectations
Sources: Reuters, MNB.
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Chart IV-7 One-year real interest rates
68 THE MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
Due to the re-valuation speculation and the related
defensive moves, the first two months of 2003 wit-
nessed unprecedented high volatility in capital flows. In
just two days, the Hungarian foreign exchange market
received an influx of foreign currency equivalent to
over one thousand billion forints. When the failure of
the appreciation speculation became apparent, there
was a reversal of capital flows as a large portion of the
speculative funds left the country.
These unprecedented swings in capital flows did not
lead to similar movements in the exchange rate. This
was because the Bank successfully defended the strong
edge of the band with its drastic interest rate cuts, and
in the course of the subsequent outflow, used various
instruments to sell off the foreign currency reserves
built up during the two days of the revaluation specu-
lation in order to mitigate the depreciation pressure.
By end-February, the Bank had sold roughly half of the
foreign currency purchased during the two days of the
attack. In addition, data on interbank transactions in
foreign exchange markets indicated that taking advan-
tage of the weak exchange rate of the forint, the
domestic non-bank sector made forward currency
sales partly for hedging and partly for speculative pur-
poses. Commercial banks hedged these transactions
by spot foreign currency sales, which provided another
channel in addition to the central bank’s intervention
for making foreign speculative capital leave the coun-
CAPITAL FLOWS
IV. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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2002 2003
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Jan. Feb.
I. Current account, net –117 –176 –70 –306 –63 –101
II. Capital account 13 15 6 13 –19 –5
III. FDI inflow 
(excluding privatisation revenue) 27 80 19 28 –9 –23
IV. Forint demand arising form conversion 
of domestic foreign currency deposits 60 –62 26 –40 54 4
1. Business sector 25 –70 13 –41 36 –1
2. Households 35 8 13 0 18 5
V. Net portfolio investment (1.+2.+3.) 217 11 113 350 221 –22
1. Government securities 144 33 236 310 75 61
2. Equities 14 –16 –25 –36 –5 –7
3. Forint deposits 59 –7 –98 76 151 –76
VI. Corporate foreign currency 
borrowing (1.+2.) –230 –182 –167 –79 47 9
1. In Hungary 45 55 70 –23 44 24
2. Abroad  –275 –237 –237 –56 4 –15
VII. Forint demand of other credit institutions 26 119 114 138 30 –7
VIII. Other 11 125 28 152 41 37
IX. Change in banks' on-balance sheet long  
foreign currency position –7 70 –68 –256 752 –352
X. Net Central Bank Intervention (I.+…+IX.) 0 0 0 0 1055 –459
Table IV-1 Components of foreign exchange market demand and supply* (HUF billions)
* Positive values denote forint demand and negative values denote forint supply. Due to changes in BOP current account compilation methodol-
ogy, the figures are different from those published in the February Report even for earlier periods.
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try. Some commercial bank forint liabilities to non-resi-
dents were transformed in this way into liabilities to
residents. As some of these transactions were made
for hedging purposes, one could say that some of the
hot capital ‘cooled off’ even without the central bank’s
intervention.
Commercial banks’ on-balance-sheet foreign currency
position fell by HUF 750 billion in the month of the re-
valuation speculation, while their total foreign currency
exposures, also including derivative transactions,
remained neutral. Speculators were only able to acquire
forints through Hungarian commercial banks. Not wish-
ing to take any exchange rate risk, commercial banks
sold off the incoming foreign currency on the interbank
foreign exchange market. However, due to the large
supply of foreign currency, banks were only able to
acquire forints from the MNB as it intervened at the
strong edge of the band. The forints purchased were
immediately transferred into central bank deposits.
The speculative capital entered the Hungarian foreign
exchange market basically via two instruments. A
smaller portion of the foreign currency which specula-
tors converted at the commercial banks went directly
into short-term deposits, while a larger portion was
used to create synthetic deposits at the Hungarian
banks. A synthetic deposit combines conversion at the
spot rate with a swap. While the former instrument did
not affect commercial banks’ on-balance-sheet foreign
currency positions, as the foreign currency purchased
was immediately sold to the MNB, this was not the
case with the swaps. This was because commercial
banks had to record on the balance sheet the spot leg
of swap transactions following the conversion of the
foreign currency (purchase of forints), while the for-
ward leg was recorded off balance sheet. Accordingly,
commercial banks’ forint positions increased (and for-
eign currency positions fell) on the balance sheet, but
not by the full speculative inflow, but only an amount
of over HUF 750 billion which had come in through
the swaps. As the forward leg of swaps was recorded
off balance sheet, the total foreign currency position
of commercial banks remained neutral. This implies
that they were exposed to no increased exchange rate
risk either during or after the re-valuation speculation.
Simultaneously with the outflow of the foreign specu-
lative capital, commercial banks managed to close
most of their swap positions. By late February, on-bal-
ance-sheet foreign currency positions were nearly
neutral. However, from end-March commercial banks
started to open long positions in foreign currency, just
as in the period before the re-valuation speculation
(see chart IV-9).
Capital flows not directly affected by the re-valua-
tion speculation did not reflect any dramatic
change. The current and capital accounts deteriorat-
ed slightly in January and February, relative to the
corresponding period a year earlier. The weight of
foreign direct investment within financing also
declined during this period, with net outflows even
experienced. On the other hand, within portfolio
investments, non-residents continued to buy govern-
ment securities at a robust rate, although this was
somewhat slower than in 2002 Q4. Then, from mid-
March net inflows tapered off altogether. Non-resi-
dents show continued interest in buying long-term
government securities, with the average remaining
term to maturity of their holdings up to approxi-
mately 3.6 years, consistent with the previous trend.
This implies that the chief motivation behind gov-
ernment securities purchases remains the expecta-
tion of interest rate convergence over the longer
term in the context of European integration (see
chart IV-10).
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Chart IV-9 On-balance-sheet and total open
positions of commercial banks
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Benchmark yields on long-term forint government securi-
ties remained virtually unchanged between February and
April 2003, relative to the significant volatility seen previ-
ously. Yields remained flat at levels observed in the wake
of the re-valuation speculation in mid-January. The middle,
three- to five-year, section of the yield curve sank by
roughly 20-30 basis points relative to early February, while
yields at the long end of the curve remained on the whole
unchanged in the period leading up to mid-April. Thus, the
yield curve assumed a nearly horizontal shape, with
benchmark yields virtually identical at the 12-month and
15-year maturities. It should be noted that long yields,
especially those at the three- to five-year section, were
lower during the spring months than before the January
re-valuation speculation.
Opposing factors have affected the yield curve recent-
ly, cancelling each other out and causing the shape of
the curve to remain virtually unchanged since February
2003. The rise in long euro yields has exerted upward
pressure on long yields. Despite the ECB’s interest rate
cut in March, euro yields for maturities longer than one
year have risen by 20 to 30 basis points over the past
three months, causing the euro yield curve to grow
steeper. The drop in global risk premia had an opposite
effect (see section 4.1). The gradual rise in war tensions
in mid-March, and then the outbreak of the war in Iraq,
caused long yields in particular to rise by 20 basis
points. This was followed by a correction of a similar
size when the war ended.
Domestic developments influencing the yield curve
included monetary policy measures and a change in
economic prospects in the longer term. Market partici-
pants interpreted the Report published on 10 February
as a projection that the decline in short yields seen in
the aftermath of the speculation would persist for some
time. This has caused benchmark yields to fall percepti-
bly even at the three- to five-year, middle section of the
yield curve. However, this situation lasted for only two
weeks. On 25 February, when the Monetary Council
passed a decision on reinstating the original monetary
policy instruments, three- to five-year yields also
returned to levels seen two weeks earlier.
IV. MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
IV.
LONG-TERM YIELDS AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
5
6
7
8
9
10
Percent Percent
5
6
7
8
9
10
1-year 3-year 10-year
Ja
n.
 0
2
Fe
b.
 0
2
M
ar
ch
 0
2
A
pr
. 0
2 
M
ay
 0
2
Ju
ne
 0
2
Ju
ly
 0
2
A
ug
. 0
2
Se
p.
 0
2
O
ct
. 0
2
N
ov
. 0
2
D
ec
. 0
2
Ja
n.
 0
3
Fe
b.
 0
3
M
ar
ch
 0
3
Chart IV-11 Benchmark yields in the government securities market
Based on the macroeconomic data published in recent
months, the market expects less robust economic
growth over the medium term, which is not consistent
with a very tight monetary policy. This tends to exert
downward pressure on yields.
One-year implied forward rates derived from the forint
yield curve changed only slightly at long maturities in
the past quarter. The period between late January and
25 February saw an increase in forward rates at the two-
to seven-year section, followed by a decline causing the
forward curve to flatten out significantly by mid-April.
The differential between forint and euro forward rates,
a source of key information for monetary policy makers,
indicates the size of the risk premium market partici-
pants require on forint investments at different points in
time, given constant exchange rate expectations. While
the forward rate differential declined at the longer matu-
rities between February and April, it remained much
higher than in late 2002. This implies that participants in
the government securities market have a more pes-
simistic view of developments in the medium term,
including the prospects for the adoption of the euro.
In addition to the yield curve, another source of infor-
mation on market expectations about accession to
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a Reuters sur-
vey of market analysts about the prospective date of
Hungary’s entry. In the survey conducted since January
2003, each month analysts have given a later date for
EMU entry. While in January half of the respondents
mention 2007 as the likely date, most responses given
in March and April name 2008, simultaneously with an
increase in the share of 2009 voters.
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Chart IV-12 Zero coupon yield curve*
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The Reuters survey also reports changes in inflation
expectations. While the past quarter saw some improve-
ment in analysts’ inflation expectations for end-2003,
they remain significantly (40 basis points) higher than the
upper limit of the inflation target range. The fact that the
inflation expectation for end-2004 has remained virtual-
ly unchanged over the past few months (in the range of
4.1–4.2%) is an indication of analysts’ belief that the
inflation target of 3.5%  ±1% will be met (see chart IV-16).
Inflation expectations derived from the Reuters survey
have only changed with regard to 2003, with the infla-
tion path for next year remaining unchanged. The April
survey of inflation expectations indicates that following
an approximately 50-basis-point rate of disinflation for
the following month, market analysts project inflation to
rise gradually. In the latter half of 2003 the market
expects a peak rate of 5%, followed by a decline to
4.1% at end-2004 (see chart IV-17).
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Chart IV-16 Analysts' in inflation expectations
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Chart IV-17 Inflation expectations in April and the target band
Sources: Reuters, MNB.
Source: Reuters.
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Hungary’s EU accession scheduled for May 2004 will
entail changes in and approximation of both legislative
and tax regulations. The following section summarises
the quantified impact of mandatory measures on infla-
tion in the years to come. One should note however,
that the Bank’s inflation forecast for 2003–2004 already
takes these effects into consideration.
EU accession is likely to exert permanent impact on
regulated prices at a 6- to 7-year horizon. In particular,
compliance with EU regulations governing the excise
duty on tobacco products as well as raising the level of
the current prices of household energy to that of mar-
ket prices are bound to be a long process.
In line with the above, the Bank assumes that EU acces-
sion-related actions will raise the price index by approx-
imately 0.5–0.6 and 0.2–0.5 percentage points in 2003
and 2004, respectively (see table V-1).
The market pricing of gas rates charged to households
depends on (i) future domestic gas production and (ii)
the difference between the global market price of gas
and domestic production costs, as MOL can only top
up subsidy funds by using its mining revenues from
domestic natural gas production. The exhaustion of the
financial resources on which subsidy funds are based
may be tantamount to the actual market pricing of gas
rates. What poses problems is the fact that current sys
tem of tariffs are heterogeneous–some are based on
producer prices, others follow market prices according
to the amount of consumption and/or consumer classi-
fication.
The future impact of applying normal VAT rates to
household energy can hardly be quantified, as normal
rates might be changed (decreased) prior to 2008.
Current Hungarian normal rates of 25% are high rela-
tive to the ones applied in the EU.
The downward pressure on the price level exerted by
the abolition of consumption tax on coffee and gold is
a mere estimate. As far as increasing excise duty on
tobacco products is concerned, the Bank took into
account the schedule approved at meetings on deroga-
tion while preparing its projection.
Consumption tax on privately owned motor cars will be
replaced with registration fees; for the time being, how-
ever, there are no data available on either their exact
amount or terms. Currently, depending on technical
specifications, consumption tax on privately owned
motor cars varies between 10% and 32%. It is still to be
seen whether registration fees will also depend on tech-
nical specifications, or a flat rate will be introduced. Nor
has it been disclosed how CSO data will reflect such
new fees or rates, thus the Bank has opted not to quan-
tify this impact.
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V. SPECIAL TOPICS
V.
By 30 April 
2004
From 1 May
2004
From 1 January
2008
On-going until
31 December
2008
Table V-1 Expected inflationary impact of tax and regulatory harmonisation
Abolition of zero-rate VAT 
(pharmaceuticals, textbooks)
Excise duty on fuel oils as one single
category of products
Abolition of consumption tax on gold
and coffee 
Increasing excise duty on contract-
distilled pálinka 
Reduced rates of home-made fruit
spirits
Liberalisation of energy markets, 
market pricing
Abolition of consumption tax 
on privately owned motor cars
Changeover to EU’s Common
Customs Tariff
Reclassification of household energy
under normal rates
Reclassification of meals services
under normal rates 
Excise duty on tobacco 
and cigarettes 
Reclassification under reduced rates;
introduction of new reduced rates in
2004 (min. 5%).
A minimum amount of excise duty of
EUR 13/ton levied on light fuel oils.
Abolition of 35% and 12% 
consumption tax on gold and coffee.
Excise duty on contract-distilled pálin-
ka must be raised to 50% of normal
duty, which necessitates an 8.5%
raise.
A maximum of 50 litres of fruit spirits
per household.
Electricity market liberalisation 
scheduled for 2003; partial market
pricing of gas in 2004. 
Consumption tax will be replaced
with registration fees; for the time
being, there are no data on the rate
of such fees.
Average custom tariffs outside the
EU will be 1.53%; those 
of agricultural products will be 2%.
Temporary derogation of reclassifica-
tion can be sought; negotiations to
that effect are scheduled to com-
mence next year. 12% VAT remain-
ing in force until late 2007.
Hungary has been granted tempo-
rary derogation of reclassification.
A minimum of 60-euro excise duty
content per 1.000 cigarettes and
57% excise duty content of the pre-
vailing retail price (compared to EUR
29.3 and 43.5% as at 1 January 2003
in Hungary).
Areas of action  Date Description of planned measures Impact on CPI 
(percentage 
points)
0.15–0.20
none 
(–0.15)
none
none
0.25 in 2003
0.25–0.30
in 2004 
Non-
quantifiable
(–0.15)–(–0.20)
none 
none 
0.30 in 2003
0.10 in 2004 
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External demand for Hungarian exports is currently cap-
tured by assessing the import activity of Hungary’s
twelve main trading partners. The current country struc-
ture is presented in Section II, External demand.
Explicit projections for this indicator of external demand
have been published in the Reports since August 2001.
Although projection takes place on a quarterly basis,
the tables in the Reports record annual average growth
rates, consistent with the practice of other forecasters.
This facilitates comparison between the Bank’s fore-
casts and those of other institutes. While the Bank also
takes into account market forecasters’ projections, the
most important lessons are drawn from a comparison
with projections by the OECD and the IMF (and, more
recently, the European Commission). A good example is
the period from August 2001 to February 2003, when
the assessment of world economic activity was ham-
pered by uncertainties surrounding the efforts to recov-
er from a major global slowdown.
While in August 2001 it had become obvious that there
was a recession, it was less clear how deep it was. Most
analysts forecast the turning point to arrive relatively
soon (at end-2001), with a rapid recovery, on account
of the over 10% growth in 2000. With its 4.9% growth
forecast for 2001, the MNB took a more realistic
approach than the OECD and the IMF, which produced
forecasts of 7% and 6%, respectively. By November
2001 it had become clear that recession was deeper
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Chart V-1 Revisions in the projection for external demand in 2001*
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and the IMF's World Economic Outlook have been weighted together. The last data row at the bottom of the chart contains the actual data.
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and recovery would be slower than expected a quarter
earlier. Consequently, the MNB made a small down-
ward revision and the OECD and IMF sharply reduced
growth projections for 2001.28
In early 2002 it was clear that the trough of the reces-
sion was not passed in late 2001, which prompted the
MNB to considerably revise down its projections. Even
though the OECD published an updated Economic
Outlook, there were only minor revisions to its import
forecasts, and the IMF did not publish a new forecast at
that time. The preliminary data for 2001, published in
May 2002, were close to the MNB’s projection of three
months earlier. Thus, with the exception of November
2001, the MNB made somewhat more accurate assess-
ment of the depth of the recession. Consequently, the
MNB’s consecutive Reports included some significant,
but slightly smaller, revisions (see chart V-1).
In August 2001, the MNB (and the OECD) provided a
forecast for 2002 for the first time. This was governed
by confidence in a near-term, rapid recovery. In
November 2001, the Bank had anticipated a fast pick-
up in external business activity from 2002. But the
OECD, as in the case of its forecast for 2001, revised
down massively its 2002 projection; and the IMF's first
forecast for 2002 contained the likelihood of a fairly
slow recovery as well. It was in February 2002 that the
MNB recognised that the cyclical turnaround may have
delayed to early 2002, which would be followed by an
only slight upturn, or perhaps stagnation, in contrast
with a rapid upswing expected earlier. Consequently,
the Bank turned from optimistic into the most pes-
simistic forecaster, with a forecast of below 2% growth.
In May 2002, Germany released extremely weak import
data for 2002 Q1. This met the Bank's expectation of
the previous quarter. Consequently, the earlier forecast
was left almost unchanged. However, both the OECD
and the IMF reduced their forecasts by a large margin.
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Chart V-2 Revisions for the 2002 growth rate of external demand*
* See note for previous chart.
28 These especially sharp revisions by the OECD and the IMF were, to a large extent, due to the fact that they had only a short time available before pub-
lishing their projections for the assessment of the impact of the terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2001. Apparently, they pos-
sibly attached too much importance to the impact of these events. The MNB also took account of the adverse impact on the recession of the events,
but its projections were not influenced to such a great extent.
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In view of the contradictions of the recovery (weak
growth in GDP and output, coupled with rapidly deterio-
rating business confidence and stagnating imports), the
Bank also reduced further its projection for 2002 in
August and November 2002. Thus, the November fore-
cast contained a decline of nearly 2% in external
demand. Meanwhile, the OECD and the IMF also
revised down their forecasts. Finally, the revision of 
German import data in the course of the year resulted
in the Bank raising its own forecast in February 2003. In
retrospect, recent actual data appear to reinforce this
decision. Admittedly, though, the Bank made significant
revisions to its forecasts for growth in external demand
for 2002 in the period since August 2001. These revi-
sions proved somewhat larger than those by the OECD
and the IMF (see chart V-2).
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